From de0c4349422b0517698452c642db07058b7f7a35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kayos <kayos@openclaw>
Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2026 10:54:42 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?docs:=20CVE-16=20=E2=80=94=20unsigned=20USB=20f?=
 =?UTF-8?q?irmware=20flash=20(physical=20RCE)?=
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- usb-updater installs .mender bundles with no signature verification
- /etc/mender has no artifact_verify_key (confirmed from firmware extraction)
- Also: movisoc-fwu updates bootloader from USB, also unsigned
- Camera pipeline is GStreamer+kmbcamsrc (not DepthAI) — key adacam insight
- 4K H.265 video recorded continuously (undisclosed — reinforces CVE-5)
---
 CVE-LOG.md | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+)

diff --git a/CVE-LOG.md b/CVE-LOG.md
index 4a7745b..8cc89ce 100644
--- a/CVE-LOG.md
+++ b/CVE-LOG.md
@@ -130,3 +130,57 @@ Device owners are not notified that their driving behavior triggers automatic vi
 | 2026-03-14 | Second Bee (factory fresh) received, CVE-3/4/5 discovered |
 | 2026-03-14 | Hivemapper response: privacy policy link, questions ignored |
 | **2026-06-07** | **90-day window expires — full public release** |
+
+---
+
+## CVE-16 — Unsigned USB Firmware Flash (Physical Access RCE)
+
+**MITRE ID:** TBD
+**CVSS v3:** 9.8 Critical
+**Status:** Undisclosed
+**Requires:** Physical USB access to device
+
+**Description:**
+The `usb-updater` script installs Mender firmware bundles from a USB drive with no cryptographic signature verification. The only check performed is comparing `syshash.img` from the bundle against the currently installed partition — if they differ, the bundle is installed unconditionally via `mender --install`.
+
+`/etc/mender` contains no `artifact_verify_key` file, confirming Mender is not configured to verify artifact signatures on any update path (USB or OTA).
+
+**Evidence:**
+```bash
+# usb-updater (from firmware rootfs):
+UPDATE_FILE=$(find $UPDATE_DIR -name *.mender | head -n 1)
+# ... syshash comparison only ...
+mender --install $UPDATE_FILE  # NO SIGNATURE CHECK
+mender --commit
+reboot
+```
+`/etc/mender/` — no `artifact_verify_key` present (confirmed from firmware extraction)
+
+**PoC:**
+1. Create a malicious `.mender` bundle with arbitrary rootfs
+2. Place on FAT32 USB drive at `/hivemapper_update/evil.mender`
+3. Plug into device USB port
+4. Device flashes on next boot, commits, reboots into attacker firmware
+
+**Impact:** Complete, persistent, unrecoverable firmware compromise via physical access. No WiFi, no network, no credentials required.
+
+**Remediation:**
+1. Generate signing keypair, embed public key as `/etc/mender/artifact_verify_key`
+2. Sign all firmware artifacts with private key before distribution
+3. Verify signatures in `usb-updater` before calling `mender --install`
+
+---
+
+## Additional Firmware Findings (Non-CVE)
+
+### Camera Pipeline Architecture
+The camera uses GStreamer with Intel Keem Bay native ISP drivers (`kmbcamsrc`), NOT DepthAI for frame capture. Pipeline:
+- `kmbcamsrc` → VAAPI JPEG encoder → `/tmp/recording/pics/cam0pipe.jpg` (2028×1024)
+- `kmbcamsrc` → VAAPI H.265 encoder → 4K 30fps video chunks in `/tmp/recording/`
+- Device records 4K H.265 video continuously (undisclosed to users — related to CVE-5)
+
+### VPU Firmware Loading
+`StartVpu luxonis_vpu.bin` called from `start-camera.sh` before GStreamer pipeline launch. VPU handles AI inference (depthai_gate) separately from camera capture.
+
+### Bootloader Update Without Verification
+`usb-updater` also calls `movisoc-fwu -a fip.bin` to update the ARM Trusted Firmware (bootloader) from USB with no signature verification.