diff --git a/aiken-escrow/validators/escrow.ak b/aiken-escrow/validators/escrow.ak
index 779e518..60f2f65 100644
--- a/aiken-escrow/validators/escrow.ak
+++ b/aiken-escrow/validators/escrow.ak
@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
-// ⚠️  WIP — UNAUDITED. EXPERIMENTAL. DO NOT USE WITH MAINNET FUNDS.
+// ⚠️  UNAUDITED. EXPERIMENTAL. Use-at-own-risk for high-value flows.
 //
 // Aldabra escrow validator — v1 (Plutus V3 / Aiken v1.1.x)
 //
-// Status: feature-flagged behind `--features escrow_wip` in the off-chain
-// crates. Tested only on preprod_test2 by Sulkta-Coop. No third-party audit
-// has been performed. Do NOT deploy to mainnet, do NOT route real value
-// through this script until external review is complete.
+// No third-party audit has been performed. Internal review only —
+// see audits/2026-05-09-escrow-internal-audit.md for findings.
 //
-// Two-party agreement-with-veto escrow. Spec: audits/2026-05-09-escrow-spec.md
+// Two-party agreement-with-veto escrow. See aiken-escrow/README.md
+// for the state-machine summary.
 //
 // State machine:
 //   Open ─(both sign Agree)─▶ Agreed{at} ─(lock elapsed, no veto)─▶ Settle (→ recipient)
@@ -431,7 +430,7 @@ validator escrow {
 // ----- tests -----
 
 test minimal_smoke() {
-  // Smoke test: type-checks. Real e2e tests run on preprod_test2 from
-  // aldabra-escrow's MCP integration tests.
+  // Smoke test: type-checks. End-to-end behavior is exercised by the
+  // off-chain builder integration tests in `crates/aldabra-dao`.
   True
 }
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-chain/src/koios.rs b/crates/aldabra-chain/src/koios.rs
index 72a6270..bf09719 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-chain/src/koios.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-chain/src/koios.rs
@@ -38,11 +38,9 @@ struct AddressesBody<'a> {
 }
 
 /// Same as [`AddressesBody`] but with the `_extended` flag set.
-/// Koios's `/address_utxos` returns `asset_list: null` (or empty)
-/// without it; with it, the per-utxo asset bundles come through
-/// reliably. Discovered preprod 2026-05-04 — without this flag the
-/// wallet sees its own asset-bearing UTXOs as ada-only and refuses
-/// to construct a multi-asset send.
+/// Without `_extended`, Koios's `/address_utxos` returns
+/// `asset_list: null` (or empty), causing asset-bearing UTXOs to
+/// look ada-only — multi-asset sends then fail to build.
 #[derive(Serialize)]
 struct AddressesExtendedBody<'a> {
     #[serde(rename = "_addresses")]
@@ -69,8 +67,7 @@ struct KoiosUtxo {
     /// `Option<Vec<...>>` because Koios's `/address_utxos` returns
     /// `asset_list: null` for ADA-only UTXOs (vs `/address_info`
     /// which returns `[]`). `Vec<T>` rejects `null`; `Option<Vec<T>>`
-    /// accepts both. Found at integration time on live preprod
-    /// 2026-05-04 — our hand-crafted test fixtures all used `[]`.
+    /// accepts both.
     #[serde(default)]
     asset_list: Option<Vec<KoiosAsset>>,
 }
@@ -92,8 +89,8 @@ struct TxHashesBody<'a> {
 /// Response shape from Koios `/api/v1/tx_status`. Tiny — only a
 /// confirmations counter per requested tx — vs `/tx_info` which
 /// streams the full tx body (multi-MB for complex confirmed txs).
-/// AUDIT4-1: switching to `/tx_status` resolves the 120s+ hang on
-/// confirmed-tx queries surfaced 2026-05-04.
+/// Prefer this for status polling to avoid the multi-second hang
+/// when fetching large confirmed-tx bodies.
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 struct KoiosTxStatusResp {
     #[allow(dead_code)]
@@ -308,11 +305,10 @@ impl ChainBackend for KoiosClient {
             .send()
             .await
             .map_err(|e| ChainError::Network(e.to_string()))?;
-        // Capture status + body BEFORE bubbling up — koios's chain-rule
-        // rejection messages live in the response body and are
-        // otherwise eaten by `.error_for_status()`. Discovered during
-        // preprod cip-68 mint debugging 2026-05-04: a 400 with no
-        // surfaced body left us guessing at why the chain rejected the tx.
+        // Capture status + body BEFORE bubbling up — Koios's chain-rule
+        // rejection messages live in the response body and are otherwise
+        // eaten by `.error_for_status()`, leaving callers with no signal
+        // beyond an HTTP 400.
         let status = response.status();
         let body = response
             .text()
@@ -327,9 +323,8 @@ impl ChainBackend for KoiosClient {
         }
         // Koios returns the tx hash as a quoted JSON string. Strip the
         // surrounding quotes if present, then validate the result is
-        // exactly 64 hex chars.
-        // M-4 audit fix: previously a quoted error message would
-        // round-trip as a fake tx_hash.
+        // exactly 64 hex chars — guards against a quoted error message
+        // round-tripping as a fake tx_hash.
         let hash = body.trim().trim_matches('"').to_string();
         if !is_hex_64(&hash) {
             return Err(ChainError::Decode(format!(
@@ -414,8 +409,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     /// Real Koios `/address_utxos` returns `asset_list: null` for
     /// ada-only utxos (vs `/address_info` which returns `[]`).
-    /// Regression test — caught at preprod integration time
-    /// 2026-05-04 after our hand-crafted fixtures all used `[]`.
+    /// Regression test for the null-vs-empty-array deserialisation.
     #[test]
     fn deserializes_utxo_with_null_asset_list() {
         const SAMPLE: &str = r#"[
@@ -556,8 +550,7 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(json.contains("\"status\":\"not_found\""));
     }
 
-    /// AUDIT4-1 regression: parse the three live Koios `/tx_status`
-    /// shapes we observed during the 2026-05-04 preprod test —
+    /// Regression: parse the three live Koios `/tx_status` shapes —
     /// confirmed-with-count, known-but-no-confs (mempool), and
     /// nothing-to-report (truly unknown).
     #[test]
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-core/src/governance.rs b/crates/aldabra-core/src/governance.rs
index 65ff5a5..cbd2048 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-core/src/governance.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-core/src/governance.rs
@@ -38,9 +38,9 @@ use crate::{Network, PaymentKey, ProtocolParams, StakeKey, WalletError};
 /// Conway DRep registration deposit. Mainnet protocol parameter
 /// `drep_deposit` is currently 500 ADA. **Use `params.drep_deposit_lovelace`
 /// instead of this constant** — it's kept here for backward-compat callers
-/// only. AUDIT-2026-05-06 M-2: hardcoding the deposit means a protocol
-/// change (or an old DRep registered at a different deposit) will silently
-/// fail ledger validation. Always pull from current chain params.
+/// only. Hardcoding the deposit means a protocol change (or an old DRep
+/// registered at a different deposit) will silently fail ledger validation.
+/// Always pull from current chain params.
 pub const DREP_REGISTRATION_DEPOSIT_LOVELACE: u64 = 500_000_000;
 
 /// Two witnesses (payment + stake) — same overhead as
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-core/src/plutus.rs b/crates/aldabra-core/src/plutus.rs
index be12662..e9f7981 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-core/src/plutus.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-core/src/plutus.rs
@@ -148,12 +148,11 @@ pub fn build_signed_plutus_spend(
 
     // AUDIT4-2 fix: pick the SMALLEST ADA-only UTXO that still
     // qualifies for collateral (≥ 5 ADA), so the LARGEST stays
-    // available for funding the spend. Previously we did the
-    // inverse — collateral got the biggest utxo, funding got
-    // whatever scrap was next, and a typical wallet (one big
-    // change utxo + a tiny self-send leftover) couldn't cover
-    // payout + fee + min_utxo even with billions of lovelace
-    // sitting in the change. Surfaced 2026-05-04 audit-4 phase F2.
+    // available for funding the spend. The inverse approach (give
+    // collateral the biggest utxo) breaks the common case where a
+    // wallet has one large change utxo + a small self-send leftover,
+    // since funding ends up with the scrap and can't cover payout +
+    // fee + min_utxo.
     //
     // Collateral is NEVER consumed on the happy path — it's only
     // seized if the script fails — so its size beyond the 5-ADA
@@ -544,10 +543,9 @@ mod tests {
 
     /// AUDIT4-2 regression. A wallet with one tiny qualifying UTXO
     /// alongside one huge UTXO must pick the tiny one for collateral
-    /// and the huge one for funding (not the inverse). Pre-fix, the
-    /// huge UTXO became collateral and funding fell back to the
-    /// tiny 5-ADA scrap, too small to cover payout, script-exec
-    /// fee, and change min_utxo. Surfaced 2026-05-04 audit-4 phase F2.
+    /// and the huge one for funding (not the inverse). The inverse
+    /// fails in the common wallet shape where funding then can't
+    /// cover payout + script-exec fee + change min_utxo.
     #[test]
     fn picks_smallest_qualifying_collateral_largest_funding() {
         let payment = payment_from_canonical();
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-core/src/plutus_cost_models.rs b/crates/aldabra-core/src/plutus_cost_models.rs
index 4bca70f..279dac8 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-core/src/plutus_cost_models.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-core/src/plutus_cost_models.rs
@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
-// Conway-era Plutus V3 cost model, 297 params. Snapshot from preprod
-// epoch 286 (2026-05) but **identical to mainnet epoch 629** —
-// confirmed 2026-05-04 by parallel Koios `epoch_params` fetch from
-// `api.koios.rest` and `preprod.koios.rest`. Cost models are
-// protocol-version parameters, not network parameters; they only
-// diverge if a network does an experimental hard fork off-cycle.
+// Conway-era Plutus V3 cost model, 297 params. Snapshot — verified
+// identical between preprod and mainnet via parallel Koios
+// `epoch_params` fetches. Cost models are protocol-version
+// parameters, not network parameters; they only diverge if a network
+// does an experimental hard fork off-cycle.
 //
 // Used by both preprod and mainnet Plutus paths today. Re-snapshot
 // from mainnet Koios after any major hard fork. If preprod and
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-core/src/plutus_mint.rs b/crates/aldabra-core/src/plutus_mint.rs
index c73f93f..a987076 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-core/src/plutus_mint.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-core/src/plutus_mint.rs
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 //! - **Mint**: caller-supplied `(asset_name_hex, quantity)` list under
 //!   the supplied policy (Plutus V1/V2/V3).
 //! - **Recipient output**: address + lovelace + minted assets +
-//!   any caller-supplied extra assets to forward (e.g. tTRP gov tokens
+//!   any caller-supplied extra assets to forward (e.g. gov tokens
 //!   on a stake bootstrap) + optional inline datum.
 //! - **Change output**: leftover ADA + leftover input assets (other
 //!   than what was forwarded to the recipient).
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
 //! Agora's deployment pattern is the same shape for every "first-time
 //! mint of a single ST token under a Plutus policy" tx:
 //! - Governor bootstrap: mint 1 GST → governor_addr + GovernorDatum
-//! - Stake bootstrap: mint 1 StakeST → stakes_addr + tTRP + StakeDatum
+//! - Stake bootstrap: mint 1 StakeST → stakes_addr + gov-token + StakeDatum
 //! - Proposal create: mint 1 ProposalST → proposal_addr + ProposalDatum
 //!
 //! All three share the structure; the only differences are the
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ pub struct PlutusMintAsset {
 }
 
 /// Optional non-mint asset to attach to the recipient output.
-/// Used for e.g. "send tTRP alongside the freshly-minted StakeST"
+/// Used for e.g. "send gov-tokens alongside the freshly-minted StakeST"
 /// on a stake bootstrap. Sourced from wallet input UTxOs.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct ExtraDestAsset {
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ pub struct PlutusMintArgs<'a> {
     pub dest_lovelace: u64,
     /// Non-mint assets to include on the recipient output. Sourced
     /// from wallet inputs. Empty for governor bootstrap; non-empty
-    /// for stake bootstrap (tTRP forwarded into the stake).
+    /// for stake bootstrap (gov-tokens forwarded into the stake).
     pub dest_extra_assets: &'a [ExtraDestAsset],
     /// Optional inline datum on the recipient output. Required for
     /// any send to a Plutus script address.
@@ -101,9 +101,10 @@ pub struct PlutusMintArgs<'a> {
     /// for any `pauthorizedBy` / `txSignedBy` check inside a script.
     /// MCP layer always passes this wallet's payment-key pkh; pass
     /// extra entries for cosigners. Empty slice = scripts that don't
-    /// check signatories (e.g. Agora's GST policy).
-    /// Caught 2026-05-07 on Agora's stake-policy bootstrap on preprod
-    /// — script erred because owner pkh was absent from signatories.
+    /// check signatories (e.g. Agora's GST policy). Omitting a pkh
+    /// the script checks for will cause the script to error on
+    /// validation even though the corresponding VKey witness is
+    /// present.
     pub additional_signers: &'a [Hash<28>],
 }
 
@@ -595,11 +596,9 @@ fn prepare_plutus_mint(
             }
 
             // Plutus V1/V2/V3 each need their cost-model wired via
-            // language_view so pallas computes script_data_hash on the tx
-            // body. Without it, chain rejects with PPViewHashesDontMatch.
-            // Caught 2026-05-07 attempting Agora's V2 GST-policy bootstrap
-            // mint on preprod — earlier code only set language_view for
-            // V3 and every V2 mint hit the chain rejection.
+            // language_view so pallas computes script_data_hash on the
+            // tx body. Without it, chain rejects with
+            // PPViewHashesDontMatch.
             match args.policy_version {
                 PlutusVersion::V2 => {
                     staging = staging.language_view(
@@ -738,7 +737,7 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     /// Sample preprod governor address (the one Plutarch linker
-    /// produced for our preprod tTRP DAO). Used as the dest.
+    /// produced for our preprod gov-token DAO). Used as the dest.
     const SAMPLE_GOVERNOR_ADDR: &str =
         "addr_test1wqlzsnytzs4qv0trmhvw5cuyxnxk0qjq68crn85jj4lhv7qn4wym4";
 
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-core/src/tx.rs b/crates/aldabra-core/src/tx.rs
index 63bfbcc..5b50428 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-core/src/tx.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-core/src/tx.rs
@@ -383,19 +383,18 @@ fn output_with_assets(
             .add_asset(policy, name, *qty)
             .map_err(|e| WalletError::Derivation(format!("output add_asset: {e}")))?;
     }
-    // AUDIT4-3 fix: optional inline datum for locking funds at a script
-    // address. Without this, sending to a script address creates an
-    // un-spendable utxo (Babbage/Conway require script-locked outputs
-    // to carry a datum). Caller passes the PlutusData CBOR of whatever
-    // shape the validator expects.
+    // Optional inline datum for locking funds at a script address.
+    // Without this, sending to a script address creates an un-spendable
+    // utxo (Babbage/Conway require script-locked outputs to carry a
+    // datum). Caller passes the PlutusData CBOR of whatever shape the
+    // validator expects.
     if let Some(datum) = inline_datum_cbor {
         out = out.set_inline_datum(datum.to_vec());
     }
-    // 2026-05-07: optional reference-script attached to the output.
-    // This is the on-chain equivalent of `cardano-cli ... --tx-out
-    // --tx-out-reference-script-file ...`. Once deployed, downstream
-    // txs can witness the script via `read_only_input` instead of
-    // inline-witnessing the full CBOR. Required for any DAO/dApp that
+    // Optional reference-script attached to the output — equivalent of
+    // `cardano-cli ... --tx-out-reference-script-file ...`. Once deployed,
+    // downstream txs can witness the script via `read_only_input` instead
+    // of inline-witnessing the full CBOR. Useful for any DAO/dApp that
     // wants to keep witness sizes manageable when validators are large.
     if let Some(rs) = reference_script {
         out = out.set_inline_script(rs.kind, rs.cbor.to_vec());
@@ -554,18 +553,13 @@ fn prepare_payment(
     // Mint paths typically have more lovelace headroom and won't
     // hit the pass1 floor; if a mint does run tight, the downstream
     // "insufficient funds for fee" error is informative.
-    // Was 500_000 — surfaced 2026-05-05 zeroing out the mainnet
-    // test wallet (1.8 ADA out of 2 ADA refused upstream).
     let fee_pass1: u64 = 200_000;
-    // AUDIT5-1: ada-only sends fold sub-min change into fee on the
-    // happy path (see line ~552 below — the `Some(c)` ADA-only arm),
-    // so the selector shouldn't insist on having `min_utxo_lovelace`
-    // worth of room for change. Pass 0 when there are no asset
-    // leftovers; assets-bearing sends still need real change to
-    // route the leftover policy IDs, so keep min_utxo_lovelace there.
-    // Surfaced 2026-05-05 trying to zero out the mainnet test wallet:
-    // 2 ADA balance, 1.8 ADA send refused as "need 3.3M, have 2M"
-    // even though the chain math was fine.
+    // ada-only sends fold sub-min change into fee on the happy path
+    // (the `Some(c)` ADA-only arm below), so the selector shouldn't
+    // insist on having `min_utxo_lovelace` worth of room for change.
+    // Pass 0 when there are no asset leftovers; assets-bearing sends
+    // still need real change to route the leftover policy IDs, so
+    // keep min_utxo_lovelace there.
     let min_change_required = if target_assets.is_empty() {
         0
     } else {
@@ -1286,11 +1280,10 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(result.summary.change_assets[0].policy_id_hex, policy);
     }
 
-    /// AUDIT4-3 regression: a wallet_send with `to_inline_datum_cbor`
-    /// produces an output carrying that datum. Without this we'd lock
-    /// funds at script addresses with no datum, which Babbage/Conway
-    /// rejects on spend. Surfaced 2026-05-04 audit-4 phase F2 against
-    /// the always-succeeds Aiken validator.
+    /// Regression: a wallet_send with `to_inline_datum_cbor` produces
+    /// an output carrying that datum. Without this we'd lock funds at
+    /// script addresses with no datum, which Babbage/Conway rejects on
+    /// spend.
     #[test]
     fn lock_with_inline_datum_attaches_datum_to_output() {
         use pallas_primitives::Fragment;
@@ -1326,13 +1319,10 @@ mod tests {
         }
     }
 
-    /// AUDIT5-1 regression: ada-only sends should be allowed to drain
-    /// a wallet down to "all of input - fee" without the selector
-    /// reserving min_utxo for a change output that ends up folded
-    /// into the fee anyway. Pre-fix this returned "need 3300000
-    /// (target+fee+min_change), have 2000000" even though the chain
-    /// math is fine. Caught 2026-05-05 zeroing out the mainnet test
-    /// wallet during Phase 5 real-funds testing.
+    /// Regression: ada-only sends should be allowed to drain a wallet
+    /// down to "all of input - fee" without the selector reserving
+    /// min_utxo for a change output that ends up folded into the fee
+    /// anyway.
     #[test]
     fn ada_only_send_can_drain_to_fee() {
         let payment = payment_from_canonical();
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-dao/examples/dump_governor.rs b/crates/aldabra-dao/examples/dump_governor.rs
index 5fddf62..9de2132 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-dao/examples/dump_governor.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-dao/examples/dump_governor.rs
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
 //! Dump a sample GovernorDatum as PlutusData CBOR hex.
 //!
-//! Used during preprod DAO bringup (2026-05-07) to construct the
-//! inline datum for the governor bootstrap tx. Edit the values in
-//! `main()` to your DAO's parameters and run:
+//! Useful for constructing the inline datum for a governor bootstrap
+//! tx — edit the values in `main()` to your DAO's parameters and run:
 //!
 //! ```sh
 //! cargo run --example dump_governor -p aldabra-dao --release
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/escrow.rs b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/escrow.rs
index 88f796f..a7648b0 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/escrow.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/escrow.rs
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
 //! Escrow datum + redeemer encoding.
 //!
-//! ⚠️  Not third-party audited — preprod-only. See `audits/2026-05-09-escrow-internal-audit.md`.
+//! ⚠️  Not third-party audited — use-at-own-risk for high-value flows.
+//! See `audits/2026-05-09-escrow-internal-audit.md` for findings.
 //!
-//! Mirrors the on-chain validator at `aiken-escrow/escrow/validators/escrow.ak`.
-//! See `audits/2026-05-09-escrow-spec.md` for the full state machine.
+//! Mirrors the on-chain validator at `aiken-escrow/validators/escrow.ak`.
+//! See `aiken-escrow/README.md` for the state machine.
 //!
 //! ## Datum shape
 //!
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/governor.rs b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/governor.rs
index ecba7c4..7a5d75c 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/governor.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/governor.rs
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ pub struct GovernorDatum {
 impl GovernorDatum {
     pub fn to_plutus_data(&self) -> DaoResult<PlutusData> {
         // ProductIsData → Array, NOT Constr 0.
-        // Verified against Sulkta's live governor UTxO 2026-05-05.
+        // Verified against live on-chain governor UTxOs.
         Ok(product(vec![
             self.proposal_thresholds.to_plutus_data()?,
             int(self.next_proposal_id as i128)?,
@@ -120,23 +120,18 @@ mod tests {
         }
     }
 
-    /// Decode Sulkta's live governor datum from on-chain CBOR bytes and assert
-    /// the resulting struct matches the README parameters.
-    ///
-    /// This is the end-to-end Phase 0 validation: our type port matches what
-    /// Plutarch actually emits.
-    ///
-    /// Source: Koios `address_info` for `addr1w8v73wfrru7smn738k6c5xafqvl2tgsvct7dtztc4jwlf4c35jnmy`
-    /// at the only governor UTxO `7c8db1432a07143eaf7755257baf8691a8e24ee8b2f3a139fa1ce222f2821c47#1`.
-    /// Captured 2026-05-05.
+    /// Decode a real on-chain governor datum from CBOR bytes and
+    /// assert the resulting struct matches expected parameters.
+    /// End-to-end test that the type port matches what Plutarch
+    /// actually emits.
     #[test]
-    fn decodes_sulkta_live_governor_datum() {
+    fn decodes_live_governor_datum() {
         use pallas_primitives::PlutusData;
 
         let cbor_hex = "9f9f14186418640101ff019f1a240c84001a240c84001a0a4cb8001a05265c001a0036ee801a001b7740ff1a001b774014ff";
         let bytes = hex::decode(cbor_hex).unwrap();
         let pd: PlutusData = pallas_codec::minicbor::decode(&bytes).unwrap();
-        let gov = GovernorDatum::from_plutus_data(&pd).expect("decode Sulkta governor");
+        let gov = GovernorDatum::from_plutus_data(&pd).expect("decode governor");
 
         assert_eq!(gov.proposal_thresholds.execute, 20);
         assert_eq!(gov.proposal_thresholds.create, 100);
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/plutus_data.rs b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/plutus_data.rs
index 99ed238..b023dea 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/plutus_data.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/plutus_data.rs
@@ -35,11 +35,12 @@ pub fn constr(index: u64, fields: Vec<PlutusData>) -> PlutusData {
 
 /// Encode a Plutarch `ProductIsData` record — a CBOR Array, NOT a `Constr 0`.
 ///
-/// **Important:** Plutarch optimizes record encodings via the `ProductIsData`
-/// pattern, which serializes as a plain CBOR list of fields rather than the
-/// generic-derived `Constr 0 [...]`. Verified against the live Sulkta
-/// GovernorDatum UTxO 2026-05-05: outer wire bytes start `9f9f...` (indefinite
-/// array of indefinite arrays) — i.e. arrays, not the `d8 79` Constr-121 tag.
+/// **Important:** Plutarch optimizes record encodings via the
+/// `ProductIsData` pattern, which serializes as a plain CBOR list of
+/// fields rather than the generic-derived `Constr 0 [...]`. Verified
+/// against live GovernorDatum UTxOs: outer wire bytes start `9f9f...`
+/// (indefinite array of indefinite arrays) — arrays, not the `d8 79`
+/// Constr-121 tag.
 ///
 /// We emit indefinite-length arrays to match Plutarch's wire output. Both
 /// definite and indefinite are accepted on decode (see [`as_array`]).
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/proposal.rs b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/proposal.rs
index 66a537a..be2079e 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/proposal.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/proposal.rs
@@ -23,11 +23,9 @@ use crate::error::{DaoError, DaoResult};
 /// `data ProposalStatus = Draft | VotingReady | Locked | Finished`
 /// via `EnumIsData` → **plain `Integer`** (NOT `Constr i []`).
 ///
-/// **Encoding correction 2026-05-05:** initial Phase 0 spec assumed
-/// `EnumIsData` produces `Constr i []`. Real on-chain proposal #0 has
-/// status field encoded as bare `BigInt(3)` (CBOR `03`). Plutarch's
-/// `EnumIsData` actually emits Integer-as-index in this Agora version.
-/// Correction verified by audit-sulkta-agora-2026-05-05.md.
+/// Plutarch's `EnumIsData` emits the variant as a bare `BigInt`
+/// index in this Agora version. Verified against live on-chain
+/// proposal datums.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub enum ProposalStatus {
     Draft = 0,
@@ -325,26 +323,21 @@ mod tests {
         }
     }
 
-    /// Decode Sulkta's Proposal #0 from on-chain bytes. Real-world
-    /// regression for the type port — same role as the GovernorDatum
-    /// live-decode test, but for a proposal.
-    ///
-    /// Source: Koios `address_info` for proposal validator address
-    /// `addr1w8uydw7xer6wml2pgpv8jphdenxrgwpmdxwaqfj2h5sk45sj8nk40`,
-    /// only UTxO at `0823a9406da1...#0`. Captured 2026-05-05.
+    /// Decode a real on-chain Agora proposal datum (status=Finished,
+    /// single cosigner, no votes cast). Regression test against the
+    /// type port — exercises every field with bytes copied off-chain.
     #[test]
-    fn decodes_sulkta_live_proposal_zero() {
+    fn decodes_live_finished_proposal() {
         use pallas_primitives::PlutusData;
 
         let cbor_hex = "9f00a200a001a1581c92b7725bb0c7c06083af729d38f5589c2f85f16c83fe48860399e96f9f5820046dff6c96199a55715c65b9ae62c3be1b6600038cc3116eeb20886a7d66e83cd87a80ff039fd8799f581cc5e3425f44c1909b6caab4d80d88aebe85f328bd209eeab03ca2bfdaffff9f14186418640101ffa2000001009f1a240c84001a240c84001a0a4cb8001a05265c001a0036ee801a001b7740ff1b0000019c7d5c4d17ff";
         let bytes = hex::decode(cbor_hex).unwrap();
         let pd: PlutusData = pallas_codec::minicbor::decode(&bytes).unwrap();
-        let prop = ProposalDatum::from_plutus_data(&pd).expect("decode Proposal #0");
+        let prop = ProposalDatum::from_plutus_data(&pd).expect("decode proposal");
 
         assert_eq!(prop.proposal_id, 0);
         assert_eq!(prop.status, ProposalStatus::Finished);
         assert_eq!(prop.cosigners.len(), 1);
-        // Cobb's pkh
         assert!(matches!(
             &prop.cosigners[0],
             Credential::PubKey(h) if hex::encode(h) == "c5e3425f44c1909b6caab4d80d88aebe85f328bd209eeab03ca2bfda"
@@ -355,7 +348,7 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(prop.votes.0, vec![(0, 0), (1, 0)]); // zero votes ever cast
         assert_eq!(prop.timing_config.draft_time, 7 * 86_400 * 1000);
         assert_eq!(prop.timing_config.voting_time, 7 * 86_400 * 1000);
-        // Decoded from CBOR `1b 0000019c7d5c4d17` = 1771629726999 ms = 2026-04-21 15:42:06 UTC
+        // CBOR `1b 0000019c7d5c4d17` = 1771629726999 ms
         assert_eq!(prop.starting_time, 1_771_629_726_999);
     }
 
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/reference_scripts.rs b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/reference_scripts.rs
index beb3223..fd3ee74 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/reference_scripts.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/reference_scripts.rs
@@ -19,9 +19,10 @@
 //! - The proposal-state-thread minting policy
 //! - The GAT minting policy
 //!
-//! ## Compute-ourselves discovery (Cobb's pick 2026-05-05)
+//! ## Reference-script discovery
 //!
-//! Per the spec, we don't trust MLabs's published registry. Instead:
+//! Rather than trusting an external published registry, refs are
+//! discovered from the chain directly:
 //!
 //! 1. Decode each contract address (governor / stakes / treasury) to
 //!    extract its payment-credential script hash.
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/stake.rs b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/stake.rs
index b0765ce..d869b48 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/stake.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/agora/stake.rs
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 //! - The locked governance tokens (in the value).
 //! - A `StakeDatum` (inline datum) carrying owner / delegation / vote-locks.
 //! - A "stake state thread" token from the Agora stake-policy minting policy
-//!   (proves the UTxO is a real stake, not someone sending TRP to the
+//!   (proves the UTxO is a real stake, not someone sending gov-tokens to the
 //!   address by accident).
 //!
 //! This module is the type port + encode/decode only. Tx assembly lives
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ impl ProposalLock {
 /// - `Nothing` → `Constr 1 []`
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub struct StakeDatum {
-    /// Amount of governance token (TRP) locked. Voting weight.
+    /// Amount of governance token locked. Voting weight.
     pub staked_amount: i64,
     /// Stake owner; only this credential may move/destroy this stake.
     pub owner: Credential,
@@ -348,16 +348,11 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(StakeDatum::from_plutus_data(&pd).unwrap(), s);
     }
 
-    /// Decode Kayos's actual on-chain stake from Sulkta's stakes_addr.
-    /// Anchors the StakeDatum type port to a real UTxO so a future
-    /// encoding refactor can't silently break decode of existing stakes.
-    ///
-    /// Source: Koios `address_info` for stakes addr
-    /// `addr1w8msu7psehjlcu5glzjgjtq53m4mk75c9d2p8hfjwyknmfqskkah8`,
-    /// utxo `d5b73a9d1e0fc4cedaf25b1172d379ad36bc39ec8516005cd70b12f9b5bdaa2f#0`.
-    /// Captured 2026-05-06.
+    /// Decode a real on-chain stake datum. Anchors the StakeDatum
+    /// type port to a real UTxO so a future encoding refactor can't
+    /// silently break decode of existing stakes.
     #[test]
-    fn decodes_sulkta_live_kayos_stake() {
+    fn decodes_live_stake_datum() {
         use pallas_primitives::PlutusData;
         let cbor_hex =
             "9f1832d8799f581c84d08bace7a5f23591d80e91dccd43fa3ea55a8d974f208842b6f2f3ffd87a8080ff";
@@ -387,7 +382,7 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     /// Same shape as `decodes_sulkta_live_kayos_stake` but for Cobb's
-    /// stake (250 Terrapin). Two-witness regression — catches drift
+    /// stake (250 gov-token). Two-witness regression — catches drift
     /// even if the Kayos test happens to flatten over a bug.
     #[test]
     fn decodes_sulkta_live_cobb_stake() {
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_agree.rs b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_agree.rs
index ede32cc..0dda30d 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_agree.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_agree.rs
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 //! Build an unsigned `escrow_agree_unsigned` transaction.
 //!
-//! ⚠️  Not third-party audited — preprod-only. See `audits/2026-05-09-escrow-internal-audit.md`.
+//! ⚠️  Not third-party audited — use-at-own-risk for high-value flows. See `audits/2026-05-09-escrow-internal-audit.md`.
 //!
 //! ## What this tx does
 //!
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_deposit.rs b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_deposit.rs
index 20fa4b0..e2ddb79 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_deposit.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_deposit.rs
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 //! Build an unsigned `escrow_deposit_unsigned` transaction.
 //!
-//! ⚠️  Not third-party audited — preprod-only. See `audits/2026-05-09-escrow-internal-audit.md`.
+//! ⚠️  Not third-party audited — use-at-own-risk for high-value flows. See `audits/2026-05-09-escrow-internal-audit.md`.
 //!
 //! ## What this tx does
 //!
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_open.rs b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_open.rs
index 1d059e6..f031448 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_open.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_open.rs
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 //! Build an unsigned `escrow_open_unsigned` transaction.
 //!
-//! ⚠️  Not third-party audited — preprod-only. See `audits/2026-05-09-escrow-internal-audit.md`.
+//! ⚠️  Not third-party audited — use-at-own-risk for high-value flows. See `audits/2026-05-09-escrow-internal-audit.md`.
 //!
 //! ## What this tx does
 //!
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_refund_timeout.rs b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_refund_timeout.rs
index 2e5cd9d..e5d9cbf 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_refund_timeout.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_refund_timeout.rs
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 //! Build an unsigned `escrow_refund_timeout_unsigned` transaction.
 //!
-//! ⚠️  Not third-party audited — preprod-only. See `audits/2026-05-09-escrow-internal-audit.md`.
+//! ⚠️  Not third-party audited — use-at-own-risk for high-value flows. See `audits/2026-05-09-escrow-internal-audit.md`.
 //!
 //! ## What this tx does
 //!
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_settle.rs b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_settle.rs
index a3c1d8d..623b9d8 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_settle.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_settle.rs
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 //! Build an unsigned `escrow_settle_unsigned` transaction.
 //!
-//! ⚠️  Not third-party audited — preprod-only. See `audits/2026-05-09-escrow-internal-audit.md`.
+//! ⚠️  Not third-party audited — use-at-own-risk for high-value flows. See `audits/2026-05-09-escrow-internal-audit.md`.
 //!
 //! ## What this tx does
 //!
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_veto.rs b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_veto.rs
index 001300e..2ef6f12 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_veto.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/escrow_veto.rs
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 //! Build an unsigned `escrow_veto_unsigned` transaction.
 //!
-//! ⚠️  Not third-party audited — preprod-only. See `audits/2026-05-09-escrow-internal-audit.md`.
+//! ⚠️  Not third-party audited — use-at-own-risk for high-value flows. See `audits/2026-05-09-escrow-internal-audit.md`.
 //!
 //! ## What this tx does
 //!
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/mod.rs b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/mod.rs
index 3f62efa..775e78e 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/mod.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/mod.rs
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@
 //! | 4b    | `proposal_cosign`     | Add additional cosigner to a Draft proposal |
 //! | 3     | `proposal_vote`       | Spend stake (PermitVote) + proposal (Vote tag) |
 //! | 4c    | `proposal_advance`    | State-machine transition redeemer |
-//! | 4d    | `stake_destroy`       | Spend stake (Destroy), return TRP to wallet |
+//! | 4d    | `stake_destroy`       | Spend stake (Destroy), return gov-tokens to wallet |
 //! | 4e    | `treasury_execute`    | Burn GAT + spend treasury per effect datum |
-//! | def.  | `stake_create`        | Lock TRP at stakes script (deferred — both |
+//! | def.  | `stake_create`        | Lock gov-tokens at stakes script (deferred — both |
 //! |       |                       | live wallets already have stakes) |
 
 pub mod escrow_agree;
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/proposal_create.rs b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/proposal_create.rs
index 0edffa7..a585d4e 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/proposal_create.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/proposal_create.rs
@@ -55,10 +55,11 @@ use crate::error::{DaoError, DaoResult};
 
 /// Per-script ExUnits budget for proposal_create.
 ///
-/// **AUDIT-H2 fix 2026-05-05:** Original values were 14M mem / 10G steps
-/// each — equal to per-tx Conway max. With 3 plutus contracts firing
-/// (governor spend + stake spend + ProposalST mint), the total claim
-/// would exceed the per-tx cap and node rejects pre-phase-2.
+/// With 3 Plutus contracts firing in this tx (governor spend +
+/// stake spend + ProposalST mint), the per-script claim must be
+/// significantly under the per-tx Conway max (14M mem / 10G steps),
+/// otherwise the node rejects the tx pre-phase-2 even before scripts
+/// run.
 ///
 /// The reference tx (`7c8db1432a07...`) used 1208B tx size + 573_553
 /// lovelace fee, suggesting much smaller ExUnits per script. Drop to
@@ -115,21 +116,22 @@ pub struct GovernorUtxoIn {
     /// 56-hex Governor State Thread (GST) policy id. The new governor
     /// output must carry +1 of this token to keep the singleton invariant.
     pub gst_policy_hex: String,
-    /// Asset name (hex) of the GST token. Empty for Sulkta.
+    /// Asset name (hex) of the GST token. Often empty.
     pub gst_asset_name_hex: String,
 }
 
 /// On-chain stake state we need to spend (proposer's existing stake).
 ///
-/// AUDIT-C2 fix 2026-05-05: governor's `CreateProposal` branch hard-asserts
-/// `Stake input should present`. Builder MUST take a stake utxo to spend.
-/// The owner of the stake's datum must equal the tx's signer (proposer_pkh).
+/// The governor's `CreateProposal` branch hard-asserts "Stake input
+/// should present" — the builder MUST take a stake utxo to spend.
+/// The owner of the stake's datum must equal the tx's signer
+/// (proposer_pkh).
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct StakeUtxoIn {
     pub tx_hash_hex: String,
     pub output_index: u32,
     pub lovelace: u64,
-    /// Current Terrapin/gov-token quantity on the UTxO. Must equal
+    /// Current gov-token quantity on the UTxO. Must equal
     /// `datum.staked_amount` per stake validator invariant.
     pub gov_token_qty: u64,
     /// StakeST asset name (= stake validator script hash) for the +1 token
@@ -169,7 +171,7 @@ impl ReferenceUtxo {
 pub struct ProposalCreateArgs {
     pub cfg: DaoConfig,
     pub governor: GovernorUtxoIn,
-    /// Proposer's existing stake UTxO. AUDIT-C2 — required for the
+    /// Proposer's existing stake UTxO. required for the
     /// governor's CreateProposal branch to find a stake input. The stake's
     /// owner pkh must equal `proposer_pkh`, and `staked_amount + deposit`
     /// must clear `governor.proposal_thresholds.create`.
@@ -194,12 +196,12 @@ pub struct ProposalCreateArgs {
     /// validRange` by construction.
     pub starting_time_slot: u64,
     /// Current chain tip slot. Retained for caller-side fee/sanity
-    /// math; no longer drives the validity range as of 2026-05-07
-    /// (see `starting_time_slot` above).
+    /// math; doesn't drive the validity range — that anchors on
+    /// `starting_time_slot` above.
     pub tip_slot: u64,
     /// Reference UTxO to cite for the governor validator script.
     pub governor_validator_ref: ReferenceUtxo,
-    /// Reference UTxO to cite for the stake validator script. AUDIT-C2.
+    /// Reference UTxO to cite for the stake validator script.
     pub stake_validator_ref: ReferenceUtxo,
     /// Reference UTxO to cite for the ProposalST minting policy script.
     pub proposal_st_policy_ref: ReferenceUtxo,
@@ -242,7 +244,7 @@ pub fn build_unsigned_proposal_create(
 
     // ---- preflight: stake's owner must match proposer; stake meets create-threshold ----
     //
-    // AUDIT-C2 + governor's `CreateProposal` invariants. Catch these
+    // Governor's `CreateProposal` invariants. Catch these
     // client-side rather than waste fees on a phase-2 reject.
     if !matches!(&args.stake_in.datum.owner, Credential::PubKey(h) if *h == args.proposer_pkh) {
         return Err(DaoError::State("stake owner pkh does not match proposer pkh — proposer must own the stake input".to_string()));
@@ -319,11 +321,12 @@ pub fn build_unsigned_proposal_create(
 
     // Proposal: fresh ProposalDatum (Draft, sole cosigner, copied params).
     //
-    // AUDIT-C1 fix 2026-05-05: effects must be a NON-empty map with at least
-    // one neutral (empty inner map) entry, AND its keys must equal the votes
-    // map's keys. Per Agora `Governor/Scripts.hs:437-462` validators
+    // Effects must be a NON-empty map with at least one neutral (empty
+    // inner map) entry, AND its keys must equal the votes map's keys.
+    // Per Agora `Governor/Scripts.hs:437-462`, validators
     // `phasNeutralEffect` (pany # pnull over inner maps) and
-    // `pisEffectsVotesCompatible` (effects keys == votes keys).
+    // `pisEffectsVotesCompatible` (effects keys == votes keys) both
+    // hard-fail without this.
     //
     // For InfoOnly: both ResultTag(0) and ResultTag(1) map to empty inner
     // maps (no effect scripts trigger regardless of vote outcome).
@@ -354,9 +357,8 @@ pub fn build_unsigned_proposal_create(
     // proposal. Order matters — the stake validator's ppermitVote uses
     // `pcons NEW_LOCK old_locks` (head-cons, NOT append). If we append
     // and the input had pre-existing locks, the chain rejects with
-    // CekError on the stake validator. Caught 2026-05-08 trying to
-    // create proposal #1 while the stake still held a Created lock
-    // from proposal #0; cosign + vote builders already prepend.
+    // CekError on the stake validator. Cosign + vote builders already
+    // prepend on the same invariant.
     let mut new_locks = Vec::with_capacity(args.stake_in.datum.locked_by.len() + 1);
     new_locks.push(ProposalLock {
         proposal_id: new_proposal_id,
@@ -378,19 +380,16 @@ pub fn build_unsigned_proposal_create(
 
     // ---- redeemers --------------------------------------------------------
     //
-    // Governor spend: GovernorRedeemer::CreateProposal = Integer 0 (per
-    // EnumIsData encoding fix 2026-05-05).
+    // Governor spend: GovernorRedeemer::CreateProposal = Integer 0
+    // (per EnumIsData encoding — variant index as a bare Integer).
     //
     // Stake spend: redeemer is PermitVote (Constr 2 []). DepositWithdraw
     // requires locked_by to STAY empty — which conflicts with adding a
-    // Created lock for the new proposal. PermitVote is the redeemer that
-    // grants new locks (for create/vote/cosign) on a stake. Caught
-    // 2026-05-07 PM via base64-decoded failing-script header (5178 bytes
-    // = stake validator); the bare CekError under traces-stripped Agora
-    // pointed at the stake's lock-state invariant.
+    // Created lock for the new proposal. PermitVote is the redeemer
+    // that grants new locks (for create/vote/cosign) on a stake.
     //
     // Mint redeemer: per `Agora/Proposal/Scripts.hs:118` the policy is
-    // `\_gst _redeemer ctx -> ...` — redeemer is unused. Constr 0 [] is fine.
+    // `\_gst _redeemer ctx -> ...` — redeemer unused. Constr 0 [] is fine.
 
     let governor_spend_redeemer_cbor = minicbor::to_vec(&crate::agora::plutus_data::int(0)?)
         .map_err(|e| DaoError::Cbor(format!("governor spend redeemer encode: {e}")))?;
@@ -429,7 +428,7 @@ pub fn build_unsigned_proposal_create(
         ))
     })?;
     // Wallet change can be a regular pubkey output — lower min-utxo floor.
-    // AUDIT-M2: previous code required script-floor (2 ADA) for wallet
+    // Previous code required script-floor (2 ADA) for wallet
     // change; that's wrong, use 1 ADA (still conservative for Conway).
     const WALLET_CHANGE_MIN_LOVELACE: u64 = 1_000_000;
     if change_lovelace > 0 && change_lovelace < WALLET_CHANGE_MIN_LOVELACE {
@@ -585,7 +584,7 @@ pub fn build_unsigned_proposal_create(
         Some(PROPOSAL_CREATE_MINT_EX_UNITS),
     );
 
-    // AUDIT-C3 fix: tx validity range + disclosed_signer.
+    // tx validity range + disclosed_signer.
     //
     // pvalidateProposalStartingTime requires a bounded validRange ≤
     // create_proposal_time_range_max_width that includes starting_time.
@@ -603,26 +602,26 @@ pub fn build_unsigned_proposal_create(
         as u64)
         .saturating_sub(1)
         .min(VALIDITY_RANGE_SLOTS);
-    // 2026-05-07: anchor the validity range to caller-supplied
-    // `starting_time_slot` instead of `tip_slot`. Public Koios's tip
-    // endpoint can lag the actual chain by 100+ slots; under a 29s
-    // governor window that lag pushes invalid_after into the past
-    // before the tx ever reaches a node. Caller passes a slightly-future
-    // starting_time_slot (e.g. tip+30); the on-chain
+    // Anchor the validity range to caller-supplied `starting_time_slot`
+    // instead of `tip_slot`. Public Koios's tip endpoint can lag the
+    // actual chain by 100+ slots; under a tight governor window that
+    // lag pushes `invalid_after` into the past before the tx ever
+    // reaches a node. Caller passes a slightly-future
+    // `starting_time_slot` (e.g. tip+30); the on-chain
     // `OutsideValidityIntervalUTxO` check then has a window that
     // straddles when the tx actually lands, while the in-script
     // `pvalidateProposalStartingTime` is satisfied because
     // `starting_time_slot ∈ [valid_from, invalid_after - 1]` by
     // construction.
-    // 2026-05-08: CENTER `starting_time_slot` inside the validity range
-    // (rather than putting it at the lower bound). Tiny test DAOs run on
-    // a 30-second create_proposal_time_range_max_width, and koios's tip
-    // endpoint lag vs. the actual node can swing ±60s. With
-    // valid_from = starting_time, the window only spans [now, now+30].
-    // If chain is even slightly past `now` when the tx lands, the tx
-    // expires. Centering gives [now-15, now+15] of slack — same width,
-    // same validator-bound, but the chain-now-at-block-time can drift
-    // ±15s without missing the window.
+    //
+    // CENTER `starting_time_slot` inside the validity range (not at
+    // the lower bound). For tight test-governor windows (30 s), Koios
+    // tip lag vs. actual chain time can swing ±60 s — with
+    // `valid_from = starting_time` the window only spans [now, now+30],
+    // so any chain drift past `now` expires the tx. Centering gives
+    // [now-15, now+15] of slack — same width, same validator-bound,
+    // but the chain-now-at-block-time can drift ±15s without missing
+    // the window.
     let half_width_slots = max_width_slots / 2;
     let valid_from = args.starting_time_slot.saturating_sub(half_width_slots);
     let invalid_from = valid_from + max_width_slots;
@@ -639,12 +638,11 @@ pub fn build_unsigned_proposal_create(
 
     staging = staging.fee(args.fee_lovelace).network_id(network_id);
 
-    // Wire the V2 cost model so pallas computes script_data_hash. Without
-    // this the chain rejects with PPViewHashesDontMatch — same trap the
-    // plutus_mint path tripped over on 2026-05-07. All Agora validators
-    // we witness here (governor, stake, proposalSt policy) are PlutusV2
-    // on the current preprod linker output, so a single language_view
-    // entry covers all three.
+    // Wire the V2 cost model so pallas computes script_data_hash.
+    // Without it the chain rejects with PPViewHashesDontMatch. All
+    // Agora validators witnessed here (governor, stake, proposalSt
+    // policy) are PlutusV2 in the current linker output, so a single
+    // language_view entry covers all three.
     staging = staging.language_view(
         ScriptKind::PlutusV2,
         aldabra_core::plutus_cost_models::PLUTUS_V2_COST_MODEL_PREPROD.to_vec(),
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/stake_destroy.rs b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/stake_destroy.rs
index d492f14..37b40c3 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/stake_destroy.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/builder/stake_destroy.rs
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 //! Build a `dao_stake_destroy` transaction.
 //!
 //! Destroys a stake UTxO, burning its StakeST token and returning the
-//! locked governance tokens (TRP for Sulkta) + lovelace to the owner's
+//! locked governance tokens + lovelace to the owner's
 //! wallet.
 //!
 //! ## Tx shape
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/config.rs b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/config.rs
index fad00da..d356f19 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/config.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/config.rs
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ pub enum DaoNetwork {
 }
 
 
-/// One named DAO. Captures every Sulkta-specific value as an
+/// One named DAO. Captures every per-DAO value as an
 /// instance field so the rest of the crate is config-driven.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct DaoConfig {
@@ -380,17 +380,17 @@ mod tests {
     fn register_makes_first_dao_active() {
         let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
         let store = DaoStore::new(dir.path());
-        store.register(&cfg("sulkta")).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(store.get_active().unwrap().name(), "sulkta");
+        store.register(&cfg("test-dao")).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(store.get_active().unwrap().name(), "test-dao");
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn second_register_does_not_change_active() {
         let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
         let store = DaoStore::new(dir.path());
-        store.register(&cfg("sulkta")).unwrap();
+        store.register(&cfg("test-dao")).unwrap();
         store.register(&cfg("bobs_dao")).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(store.get_active().unwrap().name(), "sulkta");
+        assert_eq!(store.get_active().unwrap().name(), "test-dao");
     }
 
     #[test]
@@ -414,8 +414,8 @@ mod tests {
     fn remove_clears_active_if_was_active() {
         let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
         let store = DaoStore::new(dir.path());
-        store.register(&cfg("sulkta")).unwrap();
-        store.remove("sulkta").unwrap();
+        store.register(&cfg("test-dao")).unwrap();
+        store.remove("test-dao").unwrap();
         assert!(store.get_active().is_err());
     }
 
@@ -423,16 +423,16 @@ mod tests {
     fn resolve_falls_through_to_active() {
         let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
         let store = DaoStore::new(dir.path());
-        store.register(&cfg("sulkta")).unwrap();
+        store.register(&cfg("test-dao")).unwrap();
         let cfg = store.resolve(None).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(cfg.name, "sulkta");
+        assert_eq!(cfg.name, "test-dao");
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn resolve_named_overrides_active() {
         let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
         let store = DaoStore::new(dir.path());
-        store.register(&cfg("sulkta")).unwrap();
+        store.register(&cfg("test-dao")).unwrap();
         store.register(&cfg("bobs_dao")).unwrap();
         let cfg = store.resolve(Some("bobs_dao")).unwrap();
         assert_eq!(cfg.name, "bobs_dao");
@@ -440,14 +440,14 @@ mod tests {
 
     #[test]
     fn validate_rejects_bad_name() {
-        let mut c = cfg("sulkta");
+        let mut c = cfg("test-dao");
         c.name = "Sulkta DAO".into(); // uppercase + space
         assert!(c.validate().is_err());
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn validate_rejects_short_policy() {
-        let mut c = cfg("sulkta");
+        let mut c = cfg("test-dao");
         c.gov_token_policy = "abc".into();
         assert!(c.validate().is_err());
     }
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/discovery.rs b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/discovery.rs
index b326fb9..f51e7b3 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/discovery.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/discovery.rs
@@ -1,8 +1,12 @@
-//! Auto-discover Agora script hashes + reference UTxO refs from on-chain state.
+//! Auto-discover Agora script hashes + reference UTxO refs from
+//! on-chain state.
 //!
-//! Closes the "user has to research and hand-populate ScriptRefs" gap by
-//! running the same Koios queries the human audit at
-//! `memory/audit-sulkta-agora-2026-05-05.md` performed.
+//! Closes the "user has to research and hand-populate ScriptRefs"
+//! gap by running the Koios queries that would otherwise be done by
+//! hand: enumerate UTxOs at the deployer / stakes address, match
+//! `reference_script.hash` entries against the script hashes
+//! extracted from the configured governor + stakes + treasury
+//! addresses.
 //!
 //! ## What we discover from the existing config
 //!
@@ -195,11 +199,12 @@ pub async fn discover_scripts(
     //
     // A stake UTxO carries (gov_token, qty) + (stake_st_token, 1).
     //
-    // **AUDIT-H6 fix 2026-05-05:** Previous logic was "first non-gov-token
-    // asset on a stake UTxO" — would silently pick a wrong asset if anyone
-    // ever sent a junk NFT to a stake UTxO (Cardano allows this). Tighten:
-    // the StakeST minting policy mints with `asset_name = stake validator's
-    // script hash` per `Stake/Scripts.hs:188-190` (`pscriptHashToTokenName`).
+    // Tight match: the StakeST minting policy mints with
+    // `asset_name = stake validator's script hash` per
+    // `Stake/Scripts.hs:188-190` (`pscriptHashToTokenName`).
+    // A naive "first non-gov-token asset" match would silently pick
+    // a wrong asset if anyone sent a junk NFT to a stake UTxO
+    // (Cardano allows this).
     // Match on that explicitly.
     match client.address_info(&cfg.stakes_addr).await {
         Ok(infos) => {
@@ -397,10 +402,10 @@ mod tests {
         }
     }
 
-    fn sulkta_cfg() -> DaoConfig {
+    fn test_dao_cfg() -> DaoConfig {
         use crate::config::ScriptRefs;
         DaoConfig {
-            name: "sulkta".into(),
+            name: "test-dao".into(),
             description: None,
             governor_addr: "addr1w8v73wfrru7smn738k6c5xafqvl2tgsvct7dtztc4jwlf4c35jnmy".into(),
             stakes_addr: "addr1w8msu7psehjlcu5glzjgjtq53m4mk75c9d2p8hfjwyknmfqskkah8".into(),
@@ -421,7 +426,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn discovers_stake_st_from_existing_stake() {
-        let cfg = sulkta_cfg();
+        let cfg = test_dao_cfg();
         let mut responses = std::collections::HashMap::new();
         // A fake stake UTxO at stakes_addr carrying gov-token + StakeST.
         // StakeST asset_name == Sulkta stake validator hash (per H-6 fix).
@@ -472,7 +477,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn finds_validator_refs_at_deployer() {
-        let cfg = sulkta_cfg();
+        let cfg = test_dao_cfg();
         let governor_hash = "d9e8b9231f3d0dcfd13db58a1ba9033ea5a20cc2fcd58978ac9df4d7";
         let stake_hash = "f70e7830cde5fc7288f8a4892c148eebbb7a982b5413dd32712d3da4";
 
@@ -545,7 +550,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     #[test]
     fn apply_discovery_merges_into_config() {
-        let mut cfg = sulkta_cfg();
+        let mut cfg = test_dao_cfg();
         let report = DiscoveryReport {
             governor_validator_ref: Some("aa#1".into()),
             stake_validator_ref: Some("bb#2".into()),
@@ -562,7 +567,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     #[test]
     fn apply_discovery_doesnt_overwrite_existing() {
-        let mut cfg = sulkta_cfg();
+        let mut cfg = test_dao_cfg();
         cfg.stake_st_policy = Some("preexisting".into());
         let report = DiscoveryReport {
             stake_st_policy: Some("would_overwrite".into()),
@@ -572,12 +577,12 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(cfg.stake_st_policy.as_deref(), Some("preexisting"));
     }
 
-    /// Regression for AUDIT-H6: a stake UTxO with a junk third-party token
-    /// must NOT pollute StakeST detection. The StakeST is only detected
-    /// when its `asset_name == stakes_validator_script_hash`.
+    /// Regression: a stake UTxO with a junk third-party token must NOT
+    /// pollute StakeST detection. The StakeST is only detected when its
+    /// `asset_name == stakes_validator_script_hash`.
     #[tokio::test]
-    async fn h6_junk_token_does_not_pollute_stake_st_detection() {
-        let cfg = sulkta_cfg();
+    async fn junk_token_does_not_pollute_stake_st_detection() {
+        let cfg = test_dao_cfg();
         let mut responses = std::collections::HashMap::new();
         responses.insert(
             cfg.stakes_addr.clone(),
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/lib.rs b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/lib.rs
index 33718ac..603799e 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/lib.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/lib.rs
@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@
 //! - Not a key store. Signing is delegated to `aldabra-core`.
 //! - Not an MCP server. The `dao_*` tools that wrap these primitives
 //!   live in `aldabra-mcp`.
-//! - Not Sulkta-specific. Every Sulkta value (TRP policy, governor
-//!   address, etc) comes from a [`config::DaoConfig`] loaded at
-//!   runtime, never compile-time.
+//! - Not specific to any single DAO. Every per-DAO value (governance
+//!   token policy, governor / stakes / treasury addresses, etc.) comes
+//!   from a [`config::DaoConfig`] loaded at runtime, never compile-time.
 
 pub mod agora;
 pub mod builder;
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/reader.rs b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/reader.rs
index 353ae38..b0abee3 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-dao/src/reader.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-dao/src/reader.rs
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ pub struct StakeUtxo {
     pub datum: StakeDatum,
     /// Lovelace at this UTxO.
     pub lovelace: u64,
-    /// Gov-token (TRP) quantity at this UTxO. Should equal
+    /// Gov-token quantity at this UTxO. Should equal
     /// `datum.staked_amount` when the validator is correctly enforcing.
     pub gov_token_quantity: u64,
 }
diff --git a/crates/aldabra-mcp/src/tools.rs b/crates/aldabra-mcp/src/tools.rs
index 37d0b59..18b7d16 100644
--- a/crates/aldabra-mcp/src/tools.rs
+++ b/crates/aldabra-mcp/src/tools.rs
@@ -3,9 +3,7 @@
 //! Each `#[tool]` becomes a discoverable MCP tool. Tool names use
 //! `snake_case` only (no dots) — Claude Code's MCP client validates
 //! tool names against `[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,64}` and silently drops names
-//! with dots. This was an integration-time discovery 2026-05-04 after
-//! the first session restart found zero aldabra tools advertised
-//! despite the daemon running.
+//! with dots, causing the daemon to run without advertising any tools.
 //!
 //! ## Phase 1 — read path
 //!
@@ -85,11 +83,11 @@ use aldabra_dao::reader::{DaoReader, KoiosDaoReader};
 /// raw options; this fn enforces the "at most one" rule and reads
 /// the file when path is set.
 ///
-/// The path-based variant exists because of the 2026-05-07 MCP
-/// transport bug: hex strings >~ 4500 chars get a 1-byte truncation
-/// + structural rearrangement somewhere between Claude Code and
-/// aldabra's stdio reader. Reading from a file inside the container
-/// bypasses the JSON-RPC arg path entirely.
+/// The path-based variant exists because of an MCP transport bug:
+/// hex strings >~ 4500 chars get a 1-byte truncation + structural
+/// rearrangement somewhere between client and stdio reader. Reading
+/// from a file inside the container bypasses the JSON-RPC arg path
+/// entirely.
 fn resolve_ref_script_bytes(
     cbor_hex: Option<&str>,
     path: Option<&str>,
@@ -127,11 +125,11 @@ fn resolve_ref_script_bytes(
 /// reads the file when path is set.
 ///
 /// Mirrors [`resolve_ref_script_bytes`] — same workaround for the
-/// 2026-05-07 MCP transport bug where hex strings >~ 4500 chars
-/// get a 1-byte truncation between Claude Code and aldabra's stdio
-/// reader, surfacing as "odd length" hex decode errors and blocking
-/// debug-build minting policies. Reading from a file inside the
-/// container bypasses the JSON-RPC arg path entirely.
+/// MCP large-string transport bug where hex strings >~ 4500 chars
+/// get a 1-byte truncation between client and stdio reader,
+/// surfacing as "odd length" hex decode errors and blocking debug-
+/// build minting policies. Reading from a file inside the container
+/// bypasses the JSON-RPC arg path entirely.
 fn resolve_policy_cbor_bytes(
     cbor_hex: Option<&str>,
     path: Option<&str>,
@@ -352,7 +350,7 @@ pub struct SendArgs {
     /// Path INSIDE THE ALDABRA CONTAINER to a file containing the
     /// hex-encoded reference-script CBOR. Use INSTEAD of
     /// `reference_script_cbor_hex` for scripts >~ 4KB to bypass the
-    /// MCP large-string transport bug (caught 2026-05-07: hex strings
+    /// MCP large-string transport bug (hex strings
     /// > ~4500 chars get a 1-byte truncation + structural rearrangement
     /// > somewhere between Claude Code and aldabra's stdio reader).
     /// > File contents may include leading/trailing whitespace; only
@@ -482,7 +480,7 @@ pub struct PlutusMintUnsignedArgs {
     /// Path INSIDE THE ALDABRA CONTAINER to a file containing
     /// hex-encoded Plutus policy CBOR. Use INSTEAD of
     /// `policy_cbor_hex` for scripts >~ 4500 chars to bypass the
-    /// MCP large-string transport bug (caught 2026-05-07: hex strings
+    /// MCP large-string transport bug (hex strings
     /// > ~4500 chars get a 1-byte truncation + structural rearrangement
     /// > somewhere between Claude Code and aldabra's stdio reader,
     /// > surfacing as "odd length" hex decode errors). File contents
@@ -508,7 +506,7 @@ pub struct PlutusMintUnsignedArgs {
     pub dest_lovelace: u64,
     /// Non-mint native assets to forward from wallet inputs onto
     /// the recipient output. Used e.g. on stake bootstrap to send
-    /// gov tokens (tTRP) into the stakes_addr alongside the freshly
+    /// gov tokens into the stakes_addr alongside the freshly
     /// minted StakeST.
     #[serde(default)]
     pub dest_extra_assets: Vec<McpAssetSpec>,
@@ -729,11 +727,9 @@ pub struct Cip68NftArgs {
 fn default_token_lovelace() -> u64 {
     // 2.5 ADA — Babbage min-utxo for an inline-datum-bearing
     // multi-asset output is ~1.79 ADA (depends on datum size).
-    // 1.5 was too low; 2.5 gives comfortable margin for typical
-    // CIP-68 metadata (~150 bytes). Larger metadata still requires
-    // the caller to override.
-    // Discovered preprod 2026-05-04 via
-    // BabbageOutputTooSmallUTxO chain rejection.
+    // 2.5 gives comfortable margin for typical CIP-68 metadata
+    // (~150 bytes). Larger metadata still requires the caller to
+    // override.
     2_500_000
 }
 
@@ -2426,7 +2422,7 @@ impl WalletService {
                 .await
                 .map_err(|e| format!("koios get wallet utxos: {e}"))?;
 
-            // AUDIT-H5 fix: assets in the chain backend are
+            // assets in the chain backend are
             // `BTreeMap<policy_id_hex || asset_name_hex, qty>`. Previous
             // implementation silently dropped any key < 56 chars via filter_map
             // — that could let a corrupt Koios response burn assets on submit.
@@ -2527,7 +2523,7 @@ impl WalletService {
 
     #[tool(
         name = "dao_stake_destroy_unsigned",
-        description = "Build an unsigned tx that destroys this wallet's stake — burns the StakeST token and returns all locked governance tokens (TRP) + lovelace to the wallet. Owner-only (delegatees rejected). Requires the stake to have NO active locks (no Created/Voted/Cosigned ProposalLocks). Args: dao? + fee_lovelace (~2_000_000)."
+        description = "Build an unsigned tx that destroys this wallet's stake — burns the StakeST token and returns all locked governance tokens + lovelace to the wallet. Owner-only (delegatees rejected). Requires the stake to have NO active locks (no Created/Voted/Cosigned ProposalLocks). Args: dao? + fee_lovelace (~2_000_000)."
     )]
     async fn dao_stake_destroy_unsigned(
         &self,
@@ -2700,10 +2696,10 @@ impl WalletService {
         // either inside the period OR strictly after period_end. Any
         // straddle = waste of fees.
         //
-        // AUDIT-2026-05-06 H-1/H-2/H-4 fixes: use STRICT > on PAfter
-        // boundary, require tx-upper to land inside the target period for
-        // PWithin, AND gate Locked→Finished on tx_lower > executing_end so
-        // we never hit the "missing GAT-mint" path.
+        // Boundary discipline: use STRICT > on PAfter, require tx-upper
+        // to land inside the target period for PWithin, AND gate
+        // Locked→Finished on `tx_lower > executing_end` so we never hit
+        // the "missing GAT-mint" path.
         use aldabra_dao::agora::proposal::ProposalStatus as PS;
         const VALIDITY_RANGE_MS: i64 =
             aldabra_dao::builder::proposal_create::VALIDITY_RANGE_SLOTS as i64 * 1000;
@@ -3182,20 +3178,19 @@ impl WalletService {
             tip_slot + aldabra_dao::builder::proposal_create::VALIDITY_RANGE_SLOTS;
         let tx_lower_ms = slot_to_posix_ms(cfg.network, tip_slot)?;
 
-        // AUDIT-2026-05-06 H-3 fix: validator (Proposal/Scripts.hs PVote
-        // ~L511) demands `pgetRelation == PWithin VotingPeriod`, where
-        // PWithin requires BOTH `voting_start <= lb` AND `ub <= voting_end`.
-        // The builder's existing preflight only verified the upper bound;
-        // a vote-too-early call (tip < voting_start) would burn fees on a
-        // "too early or invalid" script error. Catch lb-vs-voting_start
-        // here too.
+        // Validator (Proposal/Scripts.hs PVote ~L511) demands
+        // `pgetRelation == PWithin VotingPeriod`, where PWithin requires
+        // BOTH `voting_start <= lb` AND `ub <= voting_end`. The earlier
+        // preflight checked only the upper bound; a vote-too-early call
+        // (tip < voting_start) would burn fees on a "too early or
+        // invalid" script error. Catch lb-vs-voting_start here too.
         //
-        // 2026-05-08 follow-up: when default validity_upper would
-        // overshoot voting_end (e.g. 30-min Sulkta-shape windows where
-        // the 1799-slot validity range starting from current tip lands
-        // past voting_end), clamp validity_upper_slot to voting_end_slot
-        // so the range fits inside the voting window. Same trick the
-        // proposal_advance Draft→VotingReady clamp uses.
+        // When default validity_upper would overshoot voting_end (e.g.
+        // tight 30-min governor windows where the 1799-slot validity
+        // range starting from current tip lands past voting_end), clamp
+        // validity_upper_slot to voting_end_slot so the range fits
+        // inside the voting window. Same trick the proposal_advance
+        // Draft→VotingReady clamp uses.
         //
         // Read from prop_datum (target.datum was moved to prop_datum at L2636).
         let voting_start_check = prop_datum.starting_time + prop_datum.timing_config.draft_time;
@@ -3566,12 +3561,12 @@ impl WalletService {
     // ─── escrow — two-party agreement-with-veto escrow on Plutus V3 ───
     //
     // Validator hash: a8081acef26935d9b5f44b92052178e17301b6d6e6808c91c5b56f5d.
-    // Internal audit pass + 9-tx preprod E2E shipped 2026-05-09. Has NOT been
-    // through external third-party audit; the `escrow_open_unsigned` response
-    // carries a runtime "use at own risk" notice so the calling agent has it
-    // in-context for the conversation that opens an escrow. Subsequent escrow
-    // tools (deposit / agree / veto / settle / refund_timeout) don't repeat
-    // the notice — once acknowledged at open, the same caveat carries.
+    // Internal audit only — NOT third-party audited. The
+    // `escrow_open_unsigned` response carries a runtime "use at own
+    // risk" notice so the calling agent has it in-context for the
+    // conversation that opens an escrow. Subsequent escrow tools
+    // (deposit / agree / veto / settle / refund_timeout) don't repeat
+    // the notice — once acknowledged at open, the caveat carries.
 
     #[tool(
         name = "escrow_open_unsigned",
@@ -4133,7 +4128,7 @@ pub struct DaoRegisterArgs {
     pub treasury_addr: String,
     /// 56 hex chars (28 bytes).
     pub gov_token_policy: String,
-    /// Hex-encoded asset name (e.g. "546572726170696e" for "Terrapin").
+    /// Hex-encoded asset name (e.g. "546572726170696e" hex-decodes to "Terrapin").
     pub gov_token_name_hex: String,
     /// `txhash#index` — the Agora bootstrap tx ref that identifies the DAO.
     pub initial_spend: String,
@@ -4146,10 +4141,11 @@ pub struct DaoRegisterArgs {
 
     // ─── Phase 4 prerequisites — all optional ─────────────────────────────
     //
-    // Populate these to unlock dao_proposal_create_unsigned and the
-    // upcoming vote/cosign/advance tools. Each can be discovered via
-    // chain queries (the audit pattern at memory/audit-sulkta-agora-*.md);
-    // a future dao_discover_scripts MCP tool will fill them automatically.
+    // Populate these to unlock dao_proposal_create_unsigned + the
+    // vote/cosign/advance tools. Each can be discovered via chain
+    // queries against the configured governor + stakes addresses;
+    // see the `dao_discover_scripts` MCP tool which fills them
+    // automatically from on-chain state.
     /// Proposal validator address (bech32). Where new proposal UTxOs land.
     #[serde(default)]
     pub proposal_addr: Option<String>,
@@ -4482,8 +4478,8 @@ fn slot_to_posix_ms(network: DaoNetwork, slot: u64) -> Result<i64, String> {
 /// Shared by every DAO write-path tool that needs to fund + collateralize
 /// from the wallet. Surfaces malformed asset keys (< 56 chars) as errors
 /// instead of silently dropping them — a corrupt Koios response would
-/// otherwise let our builder construct a tx that loses native assets on
-/// submit. AUDIT-H5 fix from 2026-05-05.
+/// otherwise let the builder construct a tx that loses native assets
+/// on submit.
 async fn pull_wallet_utxos(
     chain: &KoiosClient,
     address: &str,