Pull-mirror of github.com/Sulkta-Coop/aldabra. Canonical lives on GitHub; this is a LAN-fast read-only cache.
Find a file
Cobb 2f3d975c0f phase 3.1, 3.4, 3.5: native policy + mint path (no metadata yet)
new aldabra-core::mint module:
- PolicySpec enum: SingleSig, SingleSigTimelock, NofK
  - SingleSig{pkh}: ScriptPubkey native script
  - SingleSigTimelock{pkh, slot}: ScriptAll[ScriptPubkey, InvalidHereafter(slot)]
  - NofK{n, [pkhs]}: ScriptNOfK
- PolicySpec::single_sig(payment) + single_sig_timelock(payment, slot)
  convenience constructors that derive the pkh from a PaymentKey.
- policy_id() = pallas_traverse::ComputeHash<28>::compute_hash, which
  is blake2b-224 of (0x00 || cbor) — the canonical native-script hash.
- to_cbor() for callers that want the script bytes raw.

build_signed_mint / build_unsigned_mint:
- two-pass fee like the send path, plus a few extras specific to mint:
  staging.mint_asset(policy, name, qty), .script(Native, cbor),
  .disclosed_signer(payment_pkh) — the disclosed_signer surfaces the
  required signature in the tx body so the chain knows which witness
  to verify against the script.
- positive qty mints (asset goes into dest output), negative qty burns
  (asset comes out of input holdings, change preserves leftover).
- token-bearing change must hold ≥ min_utxo lovelace — same guard as
  the send path.

mcp tools:
- wallet.policy.create — args: invalid_after_slot? — returns
  {policy_id_hex, script_cbor_hex, type}.
- wallet.mint — args: dest_address, dest_lovelace (≥ 1 ADA),
  asset_name_hex, quantity (i64), invalid_after_slot? — auto-generates
  a single-sig policy bound to the wallet's payment key, builds, signs,
  submits.

8 → 10 mcp tools. 48 → 56 unit tests.

3.2 (CIP-25 metadata) is BLOCKED on pallas-txbuilder 0.32/0.35 — both
hardcode `auxiliary_data: None` in the conway builder. options for next
session: (a) post-build CBOR injection, (b) assemble tx via
pallas-primitives directly, (c) wait for upstream. flagged in the
spec doc.

3.3 (CIP-68) depends on 3.2. 3.6 (MAP 2-of-2) needs the multi-key
signing flow on the build side; PolicySpec::NofK variant is ready but
build_signed_mint only sign with one key today.
2026-05-04 11:44:16 -07:00
crates phase 3.1, 3.4, 3.5: native policy + mint path (no metadata yet) 2026-05-04 11:44:16 -07:00
docs rename: sulkta-wallet → aldabra (per Cobb 2026-05-04) 2026-05-04 10:11:23 -07:00
.dockerignore phase 1: full read path — bip39 + cip-3 + cip-1852 + koios + age-mnemonic + rmcp 2026-05-04 11:09:00 -07:00
.gitignore phase 1 scaffold: cargo workspace + 3 crates + roadmap + architecture 2026-05-04 10:02:32 -07:00
Cargo.lock phase 3.1, 3.4, 3.5: native policy + mint path (no metadata yet) 2026-05-04 11:44:16 -07:00
Cargo.toml phase 3.1, 3.4, 3.5: native policy + mint path (no metadata yet) 2026-05-04 11:44:16 -07:00
Dockerfile phase 1: full read path — bip39 + cip-3 + cip-1852 + koios + age-mnemonic + rmcp 2026-05-04 11:09:00 -07:00
LICENSE phase 1 scaffold: cargo workspace + 3 crates + roadmap + architecture 2026-05-04 10:02:32 -07:00
README.md rename: sulkta-wallet → aldabra (per Cobb 2026-05-04) 2026-05-04 10:11:23 -07:00
ROADMAP.md rename: sulkta-wallet → aldabra (per Cobb 2026-05-04) 2026-05-04 10:11:23 -07:00

aldabra

Rust-native Cardano lite wallet with an MCP-server interface — built for LLM-first usage (send, receive, mint, Plutus interaction).

Status: Phase 1 scaffold (2026-05-04). Compiles, structure in place, real wallet primitives still landing. See ROADMAP.md.

Why

The existing Cardano MCP servers are either read-only doc gateways (Jimmyh-world/Cardano_MCP) or built on Blockfrost (web3-mcp) which is a centralized API we deliberately don't depend on. Sulkta runs its own Koios + Ogmios endpoints on Rackham; we want a wallet that talks directly to those.

Also: it's the first Sulkta Rust project — useful as a workout for crafting-table's Rust toolchain (per Sulkta-Coop/lucy-infra spec-crafting-table.md).

Architecture

Three crates in a Cargo workspace:

Crate Responsibility
aldabra-core Pure crypto + types. Mnemonic → root key (CIP-3), root → payment + stake key (CIP-1852), address construction, signing. No I/O, no network. This is the security boundary.
aldabra-chain Pluggable backends for chain queries. ChainBackend trait, with Koios as the phase-1 implementation. Ogmios + submission paths in phase 2.
aldabra-mcp Binary. MCP server speaking stdio. Glues core + chain together, exposes tools to the LLM client.
            ┌─────────────────────────────┐
LLM client  │       aldabra-mcp (bin)      │  stdio
─────────►  │   tool handlers, lifecycle  │  ────►
            └──────────┬──────────────────┘
                       │
              ┌────────┴────────┐
              ▼                 ▼
       ┌──────────────┐  ┌──────────────┐
       │ aldabra-core  │  │ aldabra-chain │
       │ keys, sign   │  │ Koios/Ogmios │
       └──────────────┘  └──────────────┘

MCP tools (target)

Phase 1:

  • wallet.address — derived base address at account 0, index 0
  • wallet.balance — ADA + native asset balance at the wallet's address
  • wallet.utxos — list UTXOs

Phase 2:

  • wallet.send — build, sign, submit a payment (ADA or native)
  • wallet.tx_status — poll a submitted tx hash

Phase 3:

  • wallet.mint — mint a CIP-25 / CIP-68 native asset
  • wallet.policy.create — generate a policy script (timelock, multisig)

Phase 4:

  • wallet.script.attach — attach an inline datum + reference script
  • wallet.script.spend — spend a Plutus-locked UTXO with redeemer
  • wallet.stake.delegate — delegate to a pool

Build

# Local (requires rustc 1.75+)
cargo build --release

# Through crafting-table (preferred — validates the toolchain there)
crafting-table build aldabra

Run

# Direct invocation (smoke test only — does nothing useful in phase 1)
./target/release/aldabra

# As an MCP server registered with Claude Code:
# add to ~/.claude.json:
#   "aldabra": {
#     "command": "/path/to/aldabra",
#     "env": {
#       "ALDABRA_DATA": "/mnt/cache/appdata/aldabra"
#     }
#   }

Security model

  • Mnemonic source: interactive bootstrap on first run, paste once, encrypted at rest with age. Never written to disk in plaintext.
  • Derived keys: in-memory only, ZeroizeOnDrop on every container.
  • Network exposure: stdio MCP transport — never opens a TCP socket. Only the spawning client process can reach it.
  • Multi-network: mainnet by default, but --network preview / --network preprod for testing without real ADA.

See also