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Kayos ad2d17e3d0 feat(escrow_wip): MCP escrow spend-tool surface (deposit/agree/veto/settle/refund_timeout)
Five new MCP tools wrapping the four Plutus V3 spend builders shipped
earlier in this branch:

- escrow_deposit_unsigned     → Deposit redeemer (continuing-output state)
- escrow_agree_unsigned       → Agree redeemer (Open → Agreed{at=upper}, both sign)
- escrow_veto_unsigned        → Veto redeemer (Agreed → multi-output refund)
- escrow_settle_unsigned      → Settle redeemer (Agreed → recipient payout)
- escrow_refund_timeout_unsigned → Refund redeemer (Open after open_deadline → multi-output refund)

Each takes the existing escrow UTxO ref + lovelace + datum_cbor_hex
(caller pulls via chain_address_info), the V3 validator UPLC
(inline hex OR file-path to dodge the >4500-char MCP transport bug),
the redeemer-specific args, and fee_lovelace. Validity windows
default to 30 min from chain tip; agree's window auto-clamps to
open_deadline_ms when needed.

Helper additions:
- EscrowDatum::from_cbor_hex on aldabra-dao keeps pallas-codec /
  pallas-primitives direct deps OUT of aldabra-mcp.
- decode_pkh28, resolve_validator_required, build_escrow_spend_in,
  fetch_tip_slot_ms in tools.rs — small helpers shared by all 5
  spend tools.

Drops the [features] section on aldabra-mcp's Cargo.toml. rmcp 0.1.5's
#[tool(tool_box)] macro scans the impl AST and references every
#[tool]-annotated method's generated wrapper regardless of cfg
eligibility — cfg-on-method gating fails to compile when the feature
is off because the macro emits unresolved symbol references. Pivot:
always-pull aldabra-dao/escrow_wip via the dep itself. The runtime
gate is the "WIP — UNAUDITED:" prefix in every tool description plus
the "wip_warning" field in JSON responses; the dao crate's escrow_wip
feature still gates downstream Rust consumers that want source-level
opt-out.

Verified: aldabra-mcp builds clean (default + release). 132 aldabra-
dao tests pass under --features escrow_wip including all 35 escrow
builder tests. Release binary produced.
2026-05-09 13:36:44 -07:00
.cargo build: strip Gitea token from pallas patch URLs + add cargo config 2026-05-06 07:45:37 -07:00
aiken-escrow feat(escrow_wip): aiken validator + plutus.json blueprint 2026-05-09 11:38:45 -07:00
crates feat(escrow_wip): MCP escrow spend-tool surface (deposit/agree/veto/settle/refund_timeout) 2026-05-09 13:36:44 -07:00
docs rename: sulkta-wallet → aldabra (per Cobb 2026-05-04) 2026-05-04 10:11:23 -07:00
.dockerignore phase 1: full read path — bip39 + cip-3 + cip-1852 + koios + age-mnemonic + rmcp 2026-05-04 11:09:00 -07:00
.gitignore phase 1 scaffold: cargo workspace + 3 crates + roadmap + architecture 2026-05-04 10:02:32 -07:00
Cargo.lock audit: cargo fmt + clippy --fix across workspace + retract_votes cooldown bug fix 2026-05-09 10:27:48 -07:00
Cargo.toml build: switch aldabra-pallas patch URLs to SSH 2026-05-06 07:55:32 -07:00
Dockerfile build(docker): mount git credentials as buildkit secret for pallas SSH→HTTP fetch 2026-05-06 13:45:55 -07:00
LICENSE phase 1 scaffold: cargo workspace + 3 crates + roadmap + architecture 2026-05-04 10:02:32 -07:00
README.md rename: sulkta-wallet → aldabra (per Cobb 2026-05-04) 2026-05-04 10:11:23 -07:00
ROADMAP.md rename: sulkta-wallet → aldabra (per Cobb 2026-05-04) 2026-05-04 10:11:23 -07:00

aldabra

Rust-native Cardano lite wallet with an MCP-server interface — built for LLM-first usage (send, receive, mint, Plutus interaction).

Status: Phase 1 scaffold (2026-05-04). Compiles, structure in place, real wallet primitives still landing. See ROADMAP.md.

Why

The existing Cardano MCP servers are either read-only doc gateways (Jimmyh-world/Cardano_MCP) or built on Blockfrost (web3-mcp) which is a centralized API we deliberately don't depend on. Sulkta runs its own Koios + Ogmios endpoints on Rackham; we want a wallet that talks directly to those.

Also: it's the first Sulkta Rust project — useful as a workout for crafting-table's Rust toolchain (per Sulkta-Coop/lucy-infra spec-crafting-table.md).

Architecture

Three crates in a Cargo workspace:

Crate Responsibility
aldabra-core Pure crypto + types. Mnemonic → root key (CIP-3), root → payment + stake key (CIP-1852), address construction, signing. No I/O, no network. This is the security boundary.
aldabra-chain Pluggable backends for chain queries. ChainBackend trait, with Koios as the phase-1 implementation. Ogmios + submission paths in phase 2.
aldabra-mcp Binary. MCP server speaking stdio. Glues core + chain together, exposes tools to the LLM client.
            ┌─────────────────────────────┐
LLM client  │       aldabra-mcp (bin)      │  stdio
─────────►  │   tool handlers, lifecycle  │  ────►
            └──────────┬──────────────────┘
                       │
              ┌────────┴────────┐
              ▼                 ▼
       ┌──────────────┐  ┌──────────────┐
       │ aldabra-core  │  │ aldabra-chain │
       │ keys, sign   │  │ Koios/Ogmios │
       └──────────────┘  └──────────────┘

MCP tools (target)

Phase 1:

  • wallet.address — derived base address at account 0, index 0
  • wallet.balance — ADA + native asset balance at the wallet's address
  • wallet.utxos — list UTXOs

Phase 2:

  • wallet.send — build, sign, submit a payment (ADA or native)
  • wallet.tx_status — poll a submitted tx hash

Phase 3:

  • wallet.mint — mint a CIP-25 / CIP-68 native asset
  • wallet.policy.create — generate a policy script (timelock, multisig)

Phase 4:

  • wallet.script.attach — attach an inline datum + reference script
  • wallet.script.spend — spend a Plutus-locked UTXO with redeemer
  • wallet.stake.delegate — delegate to a pool

Build

# Local (requires rustc 1.75+)
cargo build --release

# Through crafting-table (preferred — validates the toolchain there)
crafting-table build aldabra

Run

# Direct invocation (smoke test only — does nothing useful in phase 1)
./target/release/aldabra

# As an MCP server registered with Claude Code:
# add to ~/.claude.json:
#   "aldabra": {
#     "command": "/path/to/aldabra",
#     "env": {
#       "ALDABRA_DATA": "/mnt/cache/appdata/aldabra"
#     }
#   }

Security model

  • Mnemonic source: interactive bootstrap on first run, paste once, encrypted at rest with age. Never written to disk in plaintext.
  • Derived keys: in-memory only, ZeroizeOnDrop on every container.
  • Network exposure: stdio MCP transport — never opens a TCP socket. Only the spawning client process can reach it.
  • Multi-network: mainnet by default, but --network preview / --network preprod for testing without real ADA.

See also