LAN-only HTTP service that runs claude -p subprocess on behalf of Sulkta apps. Bearer token + IP allowlist gated.
Find a file
Kayos 3c77ef523e clients/kotlin: apply audit findings — per-call HTTP timeout + token redaction (cc54cfb → next)
MEDIUM:
- B1: per-call HTTP timeout on /run via Ktor request-scoped timeout block — RunRequest.timeoutSecs > defaultTimeout no longer HTTP-disconnects

LOW:
- L3: AppToken.toString() redacts plaintext token (preserves null distinguishability)
- L4: uploadFile validates filename has no control chars; typed IllegalArgumentException upfront
- L5: RunResult.resultAsObjectOrNull / resultAsTextOrNull added (matched KDoc claim)
- L1/L2: KDoc + README docs for symlink-follow + TOCTOU on uploadFile

Dep:
- ktor 2.3.12 → 2.3.13 — clears CVE-2024-49580 (HttpCache, plugin not used) by version-range

Tests added: runHttpTimeoutHonorsPerCallTimeoutSecs, appTokenToStringRedactsTokenWhenSet (+ null preserve), uploadFileRejectsControlCharFilename, runResultAsObjectOrNull/AsTextOrNull, revokeTokenEmptyName, closeIdempotent.

Audit: memory/clawdforge-audits/kotlin-cc54cfb.md
2026-04-28 23:33:08 -07:00
clawdforge runner: pipe prompts > 64KB via stdin to avoid OS argv limit 2026-04-28 22:08:47 -07:00
clients clients/kotlin: apply audit findings — per-call HTTP timeout + token redaction (cc54cfb → next) 2026-04-28 23:33:08 -07:00
.env.example v0.1 — clawdforge service scaffold 2026-04-28 16:46:44 -07:00
.gitignore clients/c: initial C SDK for clawdforge 2026-04-28 23:01:52 -07:00
compose.yml compose: pin project name to 'clawdforge' so it doesn't bleed into peer stacks 2026-04-28 17:10:39 -07:00
Dockerfile v0.1 — clawdforge service scaffold 2026-04-28 16:46:44 -07:00
LICENSE Initial commit 2026-04-28 16:43:19 -07:00
README.md v0.1 — clawdforge service scaffold 2026-04-28 16:46:44 -07:00
requirements.txt v0.1 — clawdforge service scaffold 2026-04-28 16:46:44 -07:00

clawdforge

LAN-only HTTP service that runs claude -p subprocess calls on behalf of Sulkta apps. One container holds the Claude Code subscription auth; multiple apps consume via bearer tokens + IP allowlist.

Why

  • Auth in one place — only this container needs to be claude /login'd, not every app
  • Smaller app images — apps stay tiny Python/Go containers, no node/npm/claude-cli
  • Audit log — every prompt + response chars + duration in one SQLite db
  • Reusable bone — petalparse, cauldron, johnny5 all consume the same surface

Surface

GET    /healthz                  liveness + claude --version smoke
POST   /run                      run a prompt, return parsed result
POST   /files                    upload a file, get a file_token to pass to /run
POST   /admin/tokens             mint a per-app token (admin)
GET    /admin/tokens             list app tokens (admin)
DELETE /admin/tokens/<name>      revoke a token (admin)

POST /run

{
  "prompt": "Sterilize this ingredient line: 'about 2 cups of cooked white rice'",
  "model": "sonnet",
  "system": "You are a precise recipe parser. Always reply with valid JSON.",
  "files": ["ff_..."],
  "timeout_secs": 60
}

Returns:

{
  "ok": true,
  "result": { "qty": 2, "unit": "cup", "food": "rice", "note": "cooked, white", "approx": true },
  "duration_ms": 4321,
  "stop_reason": "end_turn"
}

result is the inner {"type":"result","result":"..."} from claude -p --output-format json, auto-stripped of code fences and JSON-parsed if possible. If the inner is not valid JSON, it's returned as a string.

POST /files

multipart/form-data, field file, optional ttl_secs (60..86400, default 3600). Returns {"file_token": "ff_...", "ttl_secs": 3600, "size": 12345}. Use that token in subsequent /run requests to attach the file via claude -p --files.

Auth

Two layers:

  1. IP allowlist — global CIDR list in ALLOW_CIDRS env. Loopback always allowed. Per-app allowlist optional on top (mint with ip_cidrs: [...]).
  2. Bearer tokenAuthorization: Bearer cf_<...> for /run and /files, Authorization: Bearer <ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN> for /admin/*.

Tokens are SHA-256 hashed in SQLite. The plaintext is shown ONCE at create time.

Deploy

  1. SSH to Lucy: ssh lucy
  2. mkdir -p /mnt/user/appdata/clawdforge/{data,claude-config,claude-alt-config}
  3. Drop .env at /mnt/cache/appdata/secrets/clawdforge.env (chmod 600, root:root) — see .env.example
  4. Clone the repo to /opt/stacks/clawdforge (Lucy uses Gitea reverse-tunnel pattern)
  5. cd /opt/stacks/clawdforge && docker compose up -d --build
  6. Auth Claude CLI (one-time, persists on volume):
    docker exec -it clawdforge claude /login
    
    Walk through the device-auth flow. Credentials persist at /root/.claude/ inside the container, mapped to /mnt/user/appdata/clawdforge/claude-config/ on host.
  7. Smoke:
    curl http://192.168.0.5:8800/healthz
    
    Should report claude_present: true + a version string.
  8. Mint a token for the first consumer:
    curl -sS -X POST http://192.168.0.5:8800/admin/tokens \
      -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN" \
      -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
      -d '{"name":"cauldron","ip_cidrs":["172.24.0.0/16"]}'
    
    Save the returned token into the consumer's env.

Client snippet (Python)

import os, requests

CF = "http://192.168.0.5:8800"
TOKEN = os.environ["CLAWDFORGE_TOKEN"]

r = requests.post(
    f"{CF}/run",
    headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {TOKEN}"},
    json={
        "prompt": 'Reply with JSON: {"hello": "world"}',
        "model": "sonnet",
        "timeout_secs": 30,
    },
    timeout=60,
)
r.raise_for_status()
print(r.json()["result"])  # {'hello': 'world'}

Notes

  • The CLI is @anthropic-ai/claude-code (not the Python anthropic SDK).
  • Default model is sonnet; per-request override via model field.
  • Per-run working directory is staged under RUNS_DIR and torn down on exit, so claude can't pollute the container's working tree.
  • File uploads are scoped to the uploading app — token A can't reference token B's files.