Security:
- S1: bearer via tmpfile/--config, not cmdline arg (no /proc/<pid>/cmdline leak)
- S2/S3: JSON-escape user input in --files, --ip-cidrs, token name
- S4: URL-encode token name in revoke
- S5: refuse to source cf.env unless 0600/0400 + owner-matched
- S6: reject ; in upload paths to defeat curl @ filename injection
Correctness:
- B1: refuse cf run - on TTY stdin
- B2: replace fragile files splice with proper JSON-array composer (raw: passthrough in _json_obj_from_assoc)
- B3: disable glob on comma-split (set -f around loop)
- B4: only create stdin tmpfile when actually used
- B5: EXIT trap (was RETURN; missed _die exit)
- B6/B7: --max-time + stderr capture on uploads
- B8: drop bare Bearer header on healthz when no token
- B9: validate admin subcommand before token
- B10: wire _extract_error into HTTP-error path
- U3: dedicated '# --- end help ---' sentinel for cmd_help
New: clients/bash/test/test_cf.sh (curl wrapper mock + 23 assertions covering
all of the above; fully shellcheck-clean).
Audit: memory/clawdforge-audits/bash-347fdde.md
Kayos
7ba7058cd5