rename: aldabra → aldabra (per Sulkta 2026-05-04)

Aldabra giant tortoise (Aldabrachelys gigantea) — endemic to the
Aldabra atoll, up to 250 kg, 150-year lifespan. Long-lived,
defended, slow but unstoppable. Better metaphor for the wallet
than 'aldabra' which was on-the-tin descriptive.

All renames in one pass:
- repo: Sulkta-Coop/aldabra → Sulkta-Coop/aldabra (via gitea API)
- workspace dir: aldabra → aldabra
- crate dirs: wallet-{core,chain,mcp} → aldabra-{core,chain,mcp}
- crate names + path imports in Cargo.toml workspace + each crate
- binary name: aldabra → aldabra
- README, ROADMAP, docs/architecture: all references swept

docs/architecture.md

@@ -7,15 +7,15 @@ Deeper design notes than the README. Read this before extending.
 The three-crate split exists to keep the security-sensitive code
 auditable in isolation.
 
-- `wallet-core` — **no I/O.** Given a mnemonic + a derivation path,
+- `aldabra-core` — **no I/O.** Given a mnemonic + a derivation path,
   produces keys + addresses + signatures. Deterministic, no
   dependencies on tokio, reqwest, MCP, or anything that could
   introduce side channels. Easy to audit because it's narrow.
-- `wallet-chain` — **all the I/O lives here.** Trait-first so the MCP
+- `aldabra-chain` — **all the I/O lives here.** Trait-first so the MCP
   layer never knows whether it's talking to Koios, Ogmios, or a future
   backend. Future contributors swap implementations without touching
   the security-sensitive crate.
-- `wallet-mcp` — **the binary glue.** Owns process lifecycle, config
+- `aldabra-mcp` — **the binary glue.** Owns process lifecycle, config
   loading, MCP transport, tool registration, error mapping. The
   thinnest layer.
 
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ roughly in order:
    `--dry-run` flag for any state-changing tool.
 2. **Daemon process compromise.** If the wallet binary is exploited
    (e.g. via a malformed Koios response triggering memory corruption),
-   the keys are at risk. Mitigations: keep `wallet-core` narrow
+   the keys are at risk. Mitigations: keep `aldabra-core` narrow
    (smaller attack surface), zeroize on drop, future: drop
    privileges + seccomp the daemon.
 3. **Disk read.** The encrypted mnemonic on disk could be exfiltrated.
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ roughly in order:
 First run:
   user pastes mnemonic at interactive prompt
   ↓
-  wallet-mcp asks for an encryption passphrase
+  aldabra-mcp asks for an encryption passphrase
   ↓
   age-encrypt the mnemonic phrase
   ↓