Public-flip audit: env-driven paths, scrub audit-ticket prefixes, terser README

the host bind paths + LAN host pins replaced with env defaults. Repository URLs
→ git.sulkta.com. Audit-changelog scaffolding stripped from inline comments
(technical reasoning preserved). README sheds marketing scaffolding. AI-speak
in load-bearing prompts/SOULs left alone — that IS the product.

.env.example

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
-# Cauldron — copy to /srv/secrets/cauldron.env
+# Cauldron — copy to .env (chmod 600). Point compose at it via
-# (chmod 600, root:root). Some values are already populated by the deploy
+# CAULDRON_ENV_FILE if you keep it elsewhere.
-# bootstrap (CLAWDFORGE_*); fill in the rest before first start.
 
 # Flask
 SECRET_KEY=change-me-32-bytes-of-entropy
@@ -9,11 +8,11 @@ SECRET_KEY=change-me-32-bytes-of-entropy
 BIND_HOST=0.0.0.0
 BIND_PORT=7790
 
-# Mealie (mealie.example.com is already wired with Authentik OIDC)
+# Mealie
 MEALIE_BASE_URL=https://mealie.example.com
 MEALIE_API_TOKEN=
 
-# clawdforge (centralized claude-runner service)
+# clawdforge (claude-runner HTTP service)
 CLAWDFORGE_URL=http://clawdforge:8800
 CLAWDFORGE_TOKEN=
 DEFAULT_MODEL=sonnet
@@ -22,13 +21,14 @@ DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECS=120
 # Admin bearer for batch ops (sterilize-all, etc.) — separate from user OIDC
 ADMIN_BEARER=change-me-this-is-the-cauldron-admin-batch-token
 
-# Authentik OIDC (provisioned 2026-04-28; client_id + secret minted by Authentik)
+# Authentik OIDC (or any OIDC provider that exposes
+# /.well-known/openid-configuration)
 OIDC_ISSUER=https://auth.example.com/application/o/cauldron/
 OIDC_CLIENT_ID=
 OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=
-OIDC_REDIRECT_URI=http://0.0.0.0:7790/auth/callback
+OIDC_REDIRECT_URI=http://localhost:7790/auth/callback
 
-# DB (mariadb on the sulkta bridge)
+# DB
 DB_HOST=mariadb
 DB_PORT=3306
 DB_NAME=cauldron
@@ -39,28 +39,26 @@ DB_PASSWORD=
 # Generate with: python -c "from cryptography.fernet import Fernet; print(Fernet.generate_key().decode())"
 CAULDRON_FERNET_KEY=
 
-# --- Public-deploy hardening (added 2026-05-02 CVE audit) ---
+# --- Public-deploy hardening ---
-# Comma-separated list of authentik subjects who get the operator-tier
+# Comma-separated list of OIDC subjects who get the operator-tier /me
-# /me admin tools panel (consolidate, discover scrape). Empty = nobody.
+# admin tools panel (consolidate, discover scrape). Empty = nobody.
-# Alice's authentik sub goes here for production.
 CAULDRON_ADMIN_SUBS=
 
-# External base URL where cauldron is reachable. Set to your public host
+# External base URL where cauldron is reachable (e.g. https://cauldron.example.com).
-# (e.g. https://cauldron.example.com) when going public; leave empty for
+# Leave empty for LAN-only HTTP. When set: enables CSRF Origin guard,
-# LAN-only HTTP. When set: enables CSRF Origin guard, HSTS, secure cookie.
+# HSTS, secure cookie.
 CAULDRON_BASE_URL=
 
-# Whether the deploy is fronted by TLS (the reverse proxy apache → cauldron over
+# Whether the deploy is fronted by TLS. Independent toggle from base_url
-# the container network). Independent toggle from base_url so dev/staging can override.
+# so dev/staging can override. When true: SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=True,
-# When true: SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=True, HSTS header emitted.
+# HSTS header emitted.
 CAULDRON_BEHIND_TLS=false
 
 # Comma-separated CIDR list of trusted proxies whose X-Forwarded-* we
 # honor. Empty = trust nothing → ProxyFix is OFF and X-Forwarded-* are
-# stripped from every request. For the reverse-proxy→app deploy,
+# stripped from every request. Set this to the reverse-proxy peer's
-# set this to the reverse proxy's internal IP (e.g. 10.20.30.1/32). Any
+# address (e.g. 10.20.30.1/32). Any X-Forwarded-* from a peer outside
-# X-Forwarded-* from a peer outside this list gets dropped before
+# this list gets dropped before ProxyFix sees it.
-# ProxyFix sees it.
 CAULDRON_TRUSTED_PROXIES=
 
 # bugs.sulkta.com integration. Per-service key minted via:

README.md

@@ -1,100 +1,60 @@
 # cauldron
 
-Mealie-backed AI meal planner + shopping list for the family. LAN-only,
+Mealie-backed meal planner + shopping-list aggregator. Wraps a Mealie
-internal tool. Mealie at `mealie.example.com` is the source of truth for
+instance with: an ingredient sterilizer (free-form quantities → structured
-recipes / meal plans / shopping lists; cauldron is the AI layer + Bob's
+parses), a weekly meal-plan generator, and a household shopping list that
-branded UI on top.
+collapses cross-recipe duplicates.
 
-## Status
+## Stack
 
-**v0.1 — backend bones (current).** Ingredient sterilizer endpoint working.
+- Flask + gunicorn, Python 3.12
-No UI yet; bearer-auth API only. Frontend + Authentik OIDC arrives in v0.2.
+- Authentik (or any OIDC provider) for sessions
-Native Kotlin Android in v0.5.
+- MariaDB for per-user prefs + Fernet-encrypted Mealie tokens
+- [clawdforge](https://github.com/Sulkta-Coop/clawdforge) for the AI layer
 
-## Surface (v0.1)
+Mealie remains the source of truth for recipes / plans / shopping lists.
+Cauldron stores per-user prefs + cached metadata only.
+
+## Run
+
+```bash
+cp .env.example .env   # fill in secrets
+docker compose up -d --build
+curl http://localhost:7790/healthz
+```
+
+`CAULDRON_ENV_FILE=/path/to/secrets.env docker compose up -d` if your env
+file lives outside the repo.
+
+## Endpoints
 
 ```
 GET  /healthz                              liveness + clawdforge upstream
-GET  /api/recipes                          list Mealie recipes (paginated)
+GET  /login            /auth/callback      OIDC flow
-POST /api/sterilize/preview/<slug>         dry-run AI parse, return proposals
+GET  /me                                   account + integration status
-POST /api/sterilize/apply/<slug>           write parses back to Mealie
+GET  /plan             /list               household plan + shopping list
+GET  /api/recipes                          (admin bearer) proxy Mealie list
+POST /api/sterilize/preview/<slug>         (admin bearer) dry-run parser
+POST /api/sterilize/apply/<slug>           (admin bearer) write parses back
 ```
 
-All routes except `/healthz` require `Authorization: Bearer <ADMIN_BEARER>`.
+Admin-bearer endpoints expect `Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_BEARER`.
 
-## Architecture
+## Layout
-
-```
-Bob's phone (later: Kotlin app)
-        │
-        ▼
-  cauldron (Flask, port 7790, LAN-only)
-   ├─ Mealie API client  ─── mealie.example.com  (source of truth)
-   ├─ clawdforge client  ─── clawdforge:8800   (claude -p runner)
-   └─ Authentik OIDC (v0.2)
-```
-
-cauldron does NOT hold its own database in v0.1 — all state lives in Mealie.
-A small Postgres/MariaDB schema lands in v0.2 for Bob-specific prefs +
-chat history.
-
-## Ingredient sterilizer
-
-Mealie's CRF parser is mediocre. Alice's hand-typed recipes have lots of
-free-form quantity strings ("about 2 cups cooked white rice", "1 small
-handful kale", "a pinch of salt") that don't aggregate cleanly into a
-shopping list.
-
-The sterilizer batches all ingredients of one recipe into a single Sonnet
-call (via clawdforge), gets back parallel structured parses, then on apply
-links each parse to existing Mealie food/unit records (creating any missing
-by name) and PUTs the recipe back.
-
-Preview is non-destructive — review proposals before apply.
-
-```bash
-# Dry-run preview
-curl -sS -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_BEARER" \
-  http://0.0.0.0:7790/api/sterilize/preview/spaghetti-bolognese | jq .
-
-# Apply (creates missing foods/units by default)
-curl -sS -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_BEARER" \
-  http://0.0.0.0:7790/api/sterilize/apply/spaghetti-bolognese | jq .
-```
-
-## Deploy
-
-1. `ssh your-host`
-2. `cd /mnt/user/appdata && git clone <gitea-url> cauldron && cd cauldron/build`
-   (or wherever the deploy convention lands)
-3. Drop `.env` at `/srv/secrets/cauldron.env` (chmod 600 root:root)
-   - `CLAWDFORGE_TOKEN` is already populated by the bootstrap (see `memory/2026-04-28.md`)
-   - `MEALIE_API_TOKEN` — mint at `mealie.example.com` → user → API tokens
-   - `ADMIN_BEARER` — pick 32 bytes of entropy
-   - `SECRET_KEY` — 32 bytes for Flask sessions
-4. `docker compose up -d --build`
-5. Smoke: `curl http://0.0.0.0:7790/healthz`
-
-## Roadmap
-
-- v0.1 ✓ — sterilizer backend + Flask shell
-- v0.2 — Authentik OIDC, Bob-branded web UI, palette CSS, postgres for prefs
-- v0.3 — meal plan generator (week → Mealie meal plan write)
-- v0.4 — shopping list aggregator (read meal plan → consolidated grocery list)
-- v0.5 — native Kotlin + Compose Android app (read-only shopping list + plan view)
-
-## Repo layout
 
 ```
 cauldron/
-├─ cauldron/
+  config.py            env-driven config
-│  ├─ config.py            env-driven config
+  forge.py             clawdforge HTTP client
-│  ├─ forge.py             clawdforge HTTP client
+  mealie.py            Mealie API client
-│  ├─ mealie.py            Mealie API client
+  sterilizer.py        ingredient parse + apply pipeline
-│  ├─ sterilizer.py        ingredient parse + apply pipeline
+  aggregator.py        cross-recipe shopping aggregator
-│  └─ server.py            Flask app
+  server.py            Flask app
-├─ Dockerfile
+scripts/
-├─ compose.yml
+  build_foods_seed.py  USDA → foods seed
-├─ requirements.txt
+  clean_foods_seed.py  clawdforge-curated cleanup pass
-└─ .env.example
 ```
+
+## License
+
+MIT.

cauldron/aggregator.py

@@ -189,8 +189,8 @@ def _aggregate_one_food(
     """All ingredients for ONE food → 1+ ShoppingLines."""
     # Bucket by unit class. Ingredients with qty=None go to a separate
     # `no_qty` bucket so they DON'T silently disappear from the shopping
-    # list when Mealie's parser couldn't extract a number (audit F-15
+    # list when Mealie's parser couldn't extract a number. The killer
-    # domain, 2026-05-02). The killer feature should surface "buy onion"
+    # feature should surface "buy onion"
     # even if the source recipe just said "1 onion, chopped" without a
     # parseable quantity.
     buckets: dict[str, list[tuple[Ingredient, float]]] = {

cauldron/config.py

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ class Config:
     oidc_client_secret: str
     oidc_redirect_uri: str
 
-    # DB (mariadb)
+    # DB
     db_host: str
     db_port: int
     db_name: str
@@ -50,20 +50,18 @@ class Config:
     #   - werkzeug.middleware.proxy_fix.ProxyFix is wrapped (1 hop trusted)
     base_url: str
 
-    # Whether the deploy is fronted by TLS (a reverse proxy → cauldron over the container network).
+    # Whether the deploy is fronted by TLS. Independent toggle from
-    # Independent toggle from base_url so dev/staging can override.
+    # base_url so dev/staging can override.
     behind_tls: bool
 
     # Comma-separated list of CIDRs (or single IPs) whose X-Forwarded-*
     # headers we trust. Empty = trust nothing → ProxyFix is NOT enabled
-    # and incoming X-Forwarded-* headers from any peer are stripped before
+    # and incoming X-Forwarded-* headers from any peer are stripped
-    # they reach the app. When non-empty, only the listed peers can set
+    # before they reach the app. When non-empty, only the listed peers
-    # the perceived scheme/host/port. Audit CVE-NEW-6 (2026-05-02 PM):
+    # can set the perceived scheme/host/port. Required because gunicorn
-    # the prior `if cfg.behind_tls: ProxyFix(...)` trusted X-Forwarded-*
+    # binds 0.0.0.0:7790; without it any sibling container on the same
-    # from ANY peer that could reach :7790 — including other containers
+    # docker network could spoof X-Forwarded-Proto and have
-    # on the sulkta docker network, since gunicorn binds 0.0.0.0:7790.
+    # request.is_secure return True on plain HTTP.
-    # An attacker on a sibling container could spoof X-Forwarded-Proto
-    # and have request.is_secure return True even on plain HTTP.
     trusted_proxies: tuple[str, ...]
 
     # bugs.sulkta.com integration (vendored SDK at cauldron/vendor/bugs_sulkta).

cauldron/consolidate_foods.py

@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ def _cluster(
     a few seconds. For larger catalogs (10K+) the inner loop polls
     cancel_check every 5K comparisons so a user-initiated cancel can
     abort cleanly mid-scan rather than waiting tens of seconds. 2nd-pass
-    audit fix CODE-1 (2026-05-02 PM)."""
+    cleanly mid-scan."""
     n = len(foods)
     names = [(f.get("name") or "").strip().lower() for f in foods]
     pairs: list[list[dict]] = []

cauldron/db.py

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-"""DB access + migrations against mariadb.
+"""DB access + migrations against MariaDB.
 
-Uses PyMySQL with a tiny per-request connection (no pool) — Cauldron is
+Uses PyMySQL with a tiny per-request connection (no pool) — traffic is
-LAN-only family-internal, traffic is single-digit qps. If load ever grows
+single-digit qps. If load ever grows swap in DBUtils.PooledDB or
-swap in DBUtils.PooledDB or SQLAlchemy.
+SQLAlchemy.
 """
 from contextlib import contextmanager
 from pathlib import Path
@@ -607,12 +607,12 @@ MIGRATIONS = [
     ) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4
     """,
     # 039 — Per-household discover skips. Replaces the global
-    # `cauldron_discovered_recipes.status='rejected'` write — that flipped
+    # `cauldron_discovered_recipes.status='rejected'` write — that
-    # the row for EVERY household in EVERY group (audit finding F-2 routes,
+    # flipped the row for EVERY household in EVERY group. Different
-    # 2026-05-02). Different households have different tastes; skip is
+    # households have different tastes; skip is per-household. The
-    # per-household. The global status column stays for spam URLs an admin
+    # global status column stays for spam URLs an admin wants to nuke
-    # wants to nuke for everyone (set via a future bearer-only endpoint);
+    # for everyone (set via a future bearer-only endpoint); routine
-    # routine "not interested" goes here.
+    # "not interested" goes here.
     """
     CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS cauldron_discover_skips (
         discover_id BIGINT NOT NULL,
@@ -1900,8 +1900,8 @@ class DB:
         with cauldron_recipe_meta to derive their picking pattern:
 
             {
-              "alice@example.com": {
+              "user@example.com": {
-                "display_name": "alice",
+                "display_name": "user",
                 "total_picks": 24,
                 "cuisines": {"asian": 6, "mexican": 4, "italian": 3, ...},
                 "proteins": {"chicken": 8, "beef": 5, "fish": 2, ...},

cauldron/dedupe_recipes.py

@@ -87,15 +87,15 @@ def _cluster_by_name(
     cancel_check: Callable[[], bool] | None = None,
 ) -> list[list[dict]]:
     """Pair-based: emit one 2-recipe candidate per (i, j) where
-    token_set_ratio >= threshold. 2nd-pass audit fix (CODE-2, 2026-05-02 PM):
+    token_set_ratio >= threshold. The previous single-link agglomerative
-    the previous single-link agglomerative chained weak similarities through
+    approach chained weak similarities through the recipe corpus the
-    the recipe corpus the same way it did with foods — `chicken alfredo`
+    same way it did with foods — `chicken alfredo` → `chicken parm` →
-    → `chicken parm` → `parm chicken cutlets` → ... — collapsing dozens of
+    `parm chicken cutlets` → ... — collapsing dozens of unrelated
-    unrelated recipes into one megacluster that Sonnet then had to refuse.
+    recipes into one megacluster that Sonnet then had to refuse.
     Mirrors the pattern used in `consolidate_foods._cluster`.
 
     cancel_check, when provided, is polled every 5K pair-comparisons so a
-    user-initiated cancel can abort a long scan early (CODE-1 fix). On
+    user-initiated cancel can abort a long scan early. On
     cancel we return the pairs accumulated so far rather than raising —
     the caller's _cancelled() in run_walk will catch and exit cleanly."""
     n = len(recipes)
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ def run_apply(*, db: DB, job_id: int, mealie: Mealie) -> None:
                     # (A,B) approved+deleted; later (A,C) tries to delete A
                     # again. Mealie returns 404 — treat that as already-
                     # handled, not an error. Mirrors the consolidate
-                    # apply path. 3rd-pass audit fix CODE3-1 (2026-05-02 PM).
+                    # apply path.
                     if "404" in msg or "not found" in msg.lower():
                         log.info("[dedupe-recipes:%s] delete %s: stale (already removed)", job_id, slug)
                         continue

cauldron/discover_recipes.py

@@ -88,10 +88,9 @@ def is_public_url(url: str) -> tuple[bool, str]:
     non-loopback, non-link-local IP. Returns (ok, reason).
 
     Used by both `/api/discover/scrape-start` (pre-queue rejection) and
-    `_scrape_one` (defense-in-depth before fetch). Audit finding F-1
+    `_scrape_one` (defense-in-depth before fetch). Without this, any
-    (CRIT, 2026-05-02): without this, any session user could queue URLs
+    session user could queue URLs pointing at the LAN, the docker
-    pointing at a private LAN, the docker bridge, or cloud metadata
+    bridge, or cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254, etc).
-    endpoints (169.254.169.254, etc).
 
     Strategy:
       1. Parse the URL. Reject non-http(s) schemes.
@@ -232,9 +231,8 @@ def _scrape_one(url: str) -> tuple[dict, str | None] | None:
                 # allow_redirects=False: is_public_url validated the
                 # original host as public; a 30x to 127.0.0.1 / 169.254.x
                 # would otherwise route this scrape worker at internal
-                # services (LAN scanner, cloud metadata IMDS). 3rd-pass
+                # services (LAN scanner, cloud metadata IMDS). Treat 30x
-                # audit fix CVE-NEW3-1 (2026-05-02 PM): treat 30x as
+                # as scrape failure rather than chase the redirect chain.
-                # scrape failure rather than chase the redirect chain.
                 # The recipe_scrapers primary path has its own internal
                 # request chain that's a known residual — the docstring
                 # on is_public_url notes the long-term answer is a

cauldron/enrich_recipes.py

@@ -134,10 +134,10 @@ def run_enrich(
 
             # Heartbeat between Sonnet sub-calls so a slow verify_allergens
             # doesn't push last_progress_at past db.fail_stuck_enrich_jobs's
-            # stale_minutes (15) window. Audit CODE-5 (2026-05-02 PM):
+            # stale_minutes (15) window. Without this, two ~3-4-min
-            # without this, two ~3-4-min Sonnet calls back-to-back could
+            # Sonnet calls back-to-back could straddle the 15-min
-            # straddle the 15-min staleness gate and a still-alive job
+            # staleness gate and a still-alive job would be incorrectly
-            # would be incorrectly reaped at next worker restart.
+            # reaped at next worker restart.
             db.update_enrich_job_progress(job_id, current_slug=slug)
 
             # Verification pass: re-check contains.* booleans with a strict

cauldron/server.py

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 """Flask app — v0.2 foundation.
 
-Adds Authentik OIDC + mariadb DB + Fernet crypto for per-user Mealie
+Adds Authentik OIDC + MariaDB + Fernet crypto for per-user Mealie tokens.
-tokens. v0.1 admin endpoints stay (still bearer-gated for now); user-facing
+v0.1 admin endpoints stay (still bearer-gated for now); user-facing routes
-routes start using OIDC sessions.
+start using OIDC sessions.
 
 Routes (current):
   GET  /healthz                              liveness, no auth
@@ -64,29 +64,24 @@ def create_app() -> Flask:
     app.config.update(
         SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY=True,
         SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE="Lax",
-        # SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE: env-gated. ON when behind TLS so the
+        # ON when behind TLS so the session cookie won't ride plain HTTP
-        # session cookie won't ride over plain HTTP (sslstrip / mixed-
+        # (sslstrip / mixed-content downgrade). Off in dev so plain-HTTP
-        # content downgrade). Audit CVE-D1 (2026-05-02). Off in dev
+        # local development still works.
-        # so LAN HTTP development still works.
         SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=cfg.behind_tls,
         # 14-day session lifetime + refresh-each-request idle slide.
-        # Audit CVE-D2 (2026-05-02): Flask's default has no expiry.
+        # Flask's default has no expiry.
         PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME=timedelta(days=14),
         SESSION_REFRESH_EACH_REQUEST=True,
-        # 1 MiB body cap. Cauldron POSTs are tiny JSON; no legitimate
+        # 1 MiB body cap. All POSTs are tiny JSON.
-        # reason for a request body to exceed this. Audit CVE-G1.
         MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH=1 * 1024 * 1024,
     )
 
     # X-Forwarded-* trust chain: parse the trusted-proxy CIDR list once
     # at boot. Empty = trust nothing → ProxyFix is NOT enabled and any
     # X-Forwarded-* headers from any peer get stripped before they reach
-    # the app. Audit CVE-NEW-6 (2026-05-02 PM 2nd-pass): the prior
+    # the app. Required because gunicorn binds 0.0.0.0:7790 — without it
-    # `if cfg.behind_tls: ProxyFix(...)` trusted X-Forwarded-* from any
+    # any sibling on the same docker network could spoof X-Forwarded-Proto
-    # peer that could reach :7790 — including sibling containers on the
+    # and have request.is_secure return True on plain HTTP.
-    # sulkta docker network, since gunicorn binds 0.0.0.0:7790. An
-    # attacker on a co-located container could spoof X-Forwarded-Proto
-    # and have request.is_secure return True even on plain HTTP.
     _trusted_networks: list[ipaddress.IPv4Network | ipaddress.IPv6Network] = []
     for entry in cfg.trusted_proxies:
         try:
@@ -229,28 +224,24 @@ def create_app() -> Flask:
         u = session.get("user") or {}
         return {"is_admin": u.get("sub") in cfg.admin_subs}
 
-    # CSRF Origin/Referer check (audit CVE-A1, 2026-05-02).
+    # CSRF Origin/Referer check.
     # SAMESITE=Lax alone doesn't cover same-site subdomain CSRF (a
-    # compromised *.sulkta.com page POSTing to cauldron.example.com
+    # compromised sibling subdomain POSTing carries cookies). When
-    # carries cookies). When CAULDRON_BASE_URL is set, every state-
+    # CAULDRON_BASE_URL is set, every state-mutating request must
-    # mutating request must EXACTLY match origin (scheme+host+port).
+    # EXACTLY match origin (scheme+host+port). Bearer-token API calls
-    # Bearer-token API calls are exempt — no cookie means no CSRF
+    # are exempt — no cookie means no CSRF surface. GET/HEAD/OPTIONS
-    # surface. Pure-GET/HEAD/OPTIONS are exempt.
+    # are exempt.
     #
-    # 2nd-pass audit fix (2026-05-02 PM, CVE-NEW-1): the original guard
+    # Note: do NOT compare with startswith() on the raw base_url. An
-    # used `startswith(cfg.base_url)` which is bypassable by an attacker
+    # attacker registering `cauldron.example.com.evil.com` would pass
-    # registering `cauldron.example.com.evil.com` — its Origin string
+    # such a check. Compare parsed origins so the host match is byte-
-    # starts-with `https://cauldron.example.com`. Switched to parsed-
+    # exact at the netloc boundary.
-    # origin equality so the host comparison is byte-exact at the
-    # netloc boundary.
     def _origin_of(url: str) -> str:
         """RFC-normalized origin: lowercase scheme + lowercase host,
-        plus port unless it's the scheme's default. 3rd-pass audit fix
+        plus port unless it's the scheme's default. urlparse lowercases
-        CVE-NEW3-3 (2026-05-02 PM): the prior byte-equality compare
+        scheme but NOT host, and doesn't drop default ports, so a naive
-        could false-reject browsers that send `Origin: https://cauldron.example.com`
+        byte compare can false-reject `Origin: https://Cauldron.example.com`
-        (some preserve case in netloc) or `https://x.com:443` against a
+        or `https://x.com:443` vs a bare `https://x.com` base."""
-        bare `https://x.com` base. urlparse already lowercases scheme but
-        NOT host, and doesn't drop default ports."""
         if not url:
             return ""
         try:
@@ -294,9 +285,9 @@ def create_app() -> Flask:
                 return jsonify({"error": "csrf_origin_mismatch"}), 403
             return ("Cross-origin request rejected.", 403)
 
-    # Security response headers (audit CVE-E1, 2026-05-02). HSTS only
+    # Security response headers. HSTS only when behind TLS (sending HSTS
-    # when behind TLS (sending HSTS over HTTP is invalid). CSP is
+    # over HTTP is invalid). CSP is permissive on inline because templates
-    # permissive on inline because templates use them; tighten later.
+    # use them; tighten later.
     @app.after_request
     def _security_headers(resp):
         resp.headers.setdefault("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
@@ -349,7 +340,7 @@ def create_app() -> Flask:
         """Layered on top of require_session — only members of cfg.admin_subs
         proceed. Non-admins get a 404 (not a 403) so the route's existence
         isn't advertised. Used for `/discover` and `/consolidate` whose
-        admin-only nature was scoped per Alice 2026-05-02."""
+        admin-only nature was scoped intentionally."""
         @wraps(fn)
         def w(*a, **kw):
             u = session.get("user")
@@ -434,11 +425,10 @@ def create_app() -> Flask:
         """Canonical household_id source for session-authenticated routes.
         EVERY session-auth handler that scopes data by household MUST get
         its `hid` from this helper, never from request body / query / form
-        — otherwise we open a cross-household read/write surface (audit
+        — otherwise we open a cross-household read/write surface.
-        CODE-4 convention, 2026-05-02 PM 2nd-pass). Admin-bearer endpoints
+        Admin-bearer endpoints legitimately derive hid from
-        legitimately derive hid from `started_by_sub` because the bearer
+        `started_by_sub` because the bearer IS the trust anchor for
-        IS the trust anchor for those calls; that path is documented
+        those calls; that path is documented at the admin endpoints."""
-        separately at the admin endpoints."""
         u = session.get("user")
         if not u:
             return None
@@ -463,11 +453,10 @@ def create_app() -> Flask:
     @app.get("/healthz")
     def healthz():
         """Liveness probe. Public, intentionally minimal — returns
-        {"ok": true} or {"ok": false} ONLY. Audit CVE-E3 (2026-05-02):
+        {"ok": true} or {"ok": false} ONLY. Never echo upstream error
-        the previous version echoed upstream error strings (clawdforge URL,
+        strings here: clawdforge URLs, DB hostnames/users, etc. would
-        DB error message including hostname/user) which leak internal LAN
+        leak internal topology to anyone who can reach /healthz.
-        topology to anyone who can reach cauldron.example.com/healthz.
+        Detailed upstream check lives at /api/admin/healthz (bearer-only)."""
-        Detailed upstream check moved to /api/admin/healthz (bearer-only)."""
         try:
             with db.conn() as c, c.cursor() as cur:
                 cur.execute("SELECT 1")
@@ -505,11 +494,11 @@ def create_app() -> Flask:
 
     def _safe_next(nxt: str | None) -> str:
         """Validate a post-login redirect target is a same-origin local
-        path. Defense-in-depth open-redirect guard — we apply this BOTH
+        path. Defense-in-depth open-redirect guard — applied BOTH at the
-        at the /login stash AND at /auth/callback consumption (CVE-NEW-3
+        /login stash AND at /auth/callback consumption. The double-check
-        audit fix 2026-05-02 PM). The double-check protects against any
+        protects against any future code path that writes
-        future code path that writes session['post_login_next'] outside
+        session['post_login_next'] outside of /login, and against
-        of /login, and against percent-encoded path tricks."""
+        percent-encoded path tricks."""
         if not nxt:
             return "/me"
         # Must start with `/` and only `/`. Reject `//foo`, `/\\foo`,
@@ -526,11 +515,10 @@ def create_app() -> Flask:
             return "/me"
         # Allow only a strict path charset. Anything weirder lands at /me.
         # Path component is everything before the optional `?` / `#`.
-        # `%` is allowed for percent-encoded chars (3rd-pass audit fix
+        # `%` is allowed for percent-encoded chars so paths like
-        # CODE3-3, 2026-05-02 PM) so paths like /recipes/spaghetti%20bol
+        # /recipes/spaghetti%20bol don't silently land at /me.
-        # don't silently land at /me. Defense-in-depth: percent-decode
+        # Defense-in-depth: percent-decode and re-validate so encoded
-        # the path and re-validate so encoded path-traversal `%2e%2e/`
+        # path-traversal `%2e%2e/` is still caught.
-        # is still caught.
         path = p.path or "/"
         for ch in path:
             if not (ch.isalnum() or ch in "-_./%"):
@@ -551,11 +539,10 @@ def create_app() -> Flask:
         # otherwise route an authenticated user to an attacker page
         # right after OIDC handshake.
         nxt = _safe_next(request.args.get("next"))
-        # Already-authenticated users skip OIDC entirely (CVE-NEW-5 fix,
+        # Already-authenticated users skip OIDC entirely. Otherwise a
-        # 2026-05-02 PM): a malicious cross-origin link
+        # malicious cross-origin link `<a href=".../login?next=/poison">`
-        # `<a href="…/login?next=/some-poisoned-path">` would otherwise
+        # could silently re-trigger the OIDC handshake on a logged-in
-        # silently re-trigger the OIDC handshake on a logged-in user
+        # user and hand them off to the attacker-supplied next= path.
-        # and hand them off to the attacker-supplied next= path.
         if session.get("user"):
             return redirect(nxt)
         session["post_login_next"] = nxt
@@ -564,7 +551,7 @@ def create_app() -> Flask:
     @app.get("/auth/callback")
     def auth_callback():
         # Wrap the OIDC exchange so transient DNS/JWKS hiccups (resolver
-        # blip on auth.example.com → ConnectionError → 500) render a
+        # blip on the auth host → ConnectionError → 500) render a
         # friendly retry page instead of dumping a stack trace, AND
         # clear the stashed state so the user's retry doesn't trip the
         # MismatchingState CSRF guard from a stale state cookie.
@@ -589,10 +576,9 @@ def create_app() -> Flask:
             ), 400
         except OAuthError as e:
             # Log the full Authentik error server-side; render only a
-            # generic detail to the user. Audit CVE-NEW-8 (2026-05-02 PM):
+            # generic detail to the user. Don't echo provider error
-            # the prior `f"auth handshake failed: {e}"` echoed Authentik
+            # codes (e.g. invalid_client_id) into the auth_retry page —
-            # error codes (e.g. invalid_client_id) into the auth_retry
+            # anyone who can hit /auth/callback?state=evil could otherwise
-            # page — anyone who can hit /auth/callback?state=evil could
             # probe Authentik internals via the rendered detail.
             app.logger.warning("OIDC callback: oauth error: %s", e)
             session.pop("_state_cauldron_authlib", None)
@@ -616,13 +602,12 @@ def create_app() -> Flask:
         # session is just a serialized dict in the cookie body, but
         # carrying any pre-auth key into the authenticated state is the
         # session-fixation/contamination shape best-practice asks us to
-        # avoid. 3rd-pass audit fix INFO3-2 (2026-05-02 PM).
+        # avoid.
         session.clear()
         session["user"] = {"sub": sub, "email": email, "name": name}
         # Mark session permanent so PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME (14d) is
         # honored. Without this, Flask treats the session as a browser-
-        # session cookie (no Expires) and tab-close kills it. Audit
+        # session cookie (no Expires) and tab-close kills it.
-        # CVE-D2 (2026-05-02).
         session.permanent = True
         return redirect(nxt)
 
@@ -863,9 +848,9 @@ def create_app() -> Flask:
         # — and `picks.html` interpolated the slug straight into a JS
         # `onclick='removePick('{{ slug }}', ...)'` literal, opening a
         # stored-XSS surface where any household member viewing /picks
-        # ran the attacker's JS. Audit CVE-NEW-2 (2026-05-02 PM 2nd-pass).
+        # ran the attacker's JS. Also closes the prompt-injection-via-
-        # Also closes the prompt-injection-via-poison-slug vector since
+        # poison-slug vector — the planner would otherwise pass garbage
-        # the planner would otherwise pass garbage slugs to Sonnet.
+        # slugs straight to Sonnet.
         hid = current_household_id()
         if hid is None:
             return jsonify({"ok": False, "error": "no_household"}), 400
@@ -2311,7 +2296,7 @@ def create_app() -> Flask:
         db.finalize_consolidate_job(job_id, state="cancelled")
         return jsonify({"ok": True})
 
-    # admin variants for the operator kick-off
+    # admin variants for operator-driven kickoff (no user session)
     @app.post("/api/admin/foods/consolidate-start")
     @require_bearer
     def admin_consolidate_start():
@@ -2431,9 +2416,10 @@ def create_app() -> Flask:
             db.get_discover_imports_for_group(mealie_group_id=my_group_id)
             if my_group_id else {}
         )
-        # Per-household skips (audit F-2 routes — was a global flip).
+        # Per-household skips (was a global flip — now scoped per
-        # Default view filters out rows the caller's household has skipped;
+        # household). Default view filters out rows the caller's
-        # `?status=skipped` surfaces them so the user can unskip if needed.
+        # household has skipped; `?status=skipped` surfaces them so the
+        # user can unskip if needed.
         my_skipped = (
             db.get_skipped_discover_ids_for_household(household_id=my_hid)
             if my_hid else set()
@@ -2519,12 +2505,12 @@ def create_app() -> Flask:
     @app.post("/api/discover/reject/<int:discover_id>")
     @require_admin
     def discover_reject(discover_id: int):
-        """Per-household 'skip from discover'. Audit F-2 routes 2026-05-02:
+        """Per-household 'skip from discover'. Previously this flipped
-        previously this flipped the GLOBAL `cauldron_discovered_recipes.status
+        the GLOBAL `cauldron_discovered_recipes.status = 'rejected'`
-        = 'rejected'` field, hiding the recipe from every household in every
+        field, hiding the recipe from every household in every group.
-        group. Now writes to `cauldron_discover_skips(discover_id, household_id)`
+        Now writes to `cauldron_discover_skips(discover_id,
-        — only the caller's household stops seeing it; other households are
+        household_id)` — only the caller's household stops seeing it;
-        unaffected. Different households have different tastes."""
+        other households are unaffected."""
         u = session["user"]
         row = db.get_discovered_recipe(discover_id)
         if not row:
@@ -2566,11 +2552,11 @@ def create_app() -> Flask:
         urls = [x for x in urls if x.startswith(("http://", "https://"))][:50]
         if not urls:
             return jsonify({"error": "no valid http(s) urls"}), 400
-        # SSRF guard (audit F-1 routes, CRIT, 2026-05-02): every URL must
+        # SSRF guard: every URL must resolve to a public IP. Reject any
-        # resolve to a public IP. Reject any that hit private / loopback /
+        # that hit private / loopback / link-local / multicast / reserved
-        # link-local / multicast / reserved space — those are LAN, docker
+        # space — those are LAN, docker bridge, or cloud metadata
-        # bridge, or cloud metadata endpoints. Apply BEFORE queueing so
+        # endpoints. Apply BEFORE queueing so the caller gets a clean
-        # the caller gets a clean error per bad URL.
+        # error per bad URL.
         accepted: list[str] = []
         rejected: list[dict] = []
         for u_url in urls:
@@ -2622,7 +2608,7 @@ def create_app() -> Flask:
     @require_bearer
     def admin_sterilize_bulk_start():
         """Bearer-authed alternate to /api/sterilize/bulk-start. Body:
-            {"started_by_sub": "alice@example.com"}
+            {"started_by_sub": "user@example.com"}
         Resolves that user's household + decrypts their stored Mealie
         token + spawns a preview thread. Lets cauldron operators kick
         off bulk runs without needing a Flask session — same job state
@@ -2690,7 +2676,7 @@ def create_app() -> Flask:
     @require_bearer
     def list_recipes_api():
         # Defensive int parse — `?page=foo` previously raised ValueError
-        # and surfaced a 500 (audit CODE-9, 2026-05-02 PM).
+        # and surfaced a 500.
         try:
             page = max(1, int(request.args.get("page", "1") or "1"))
         except ValueError:
@@ -2899,11 +2885,11 @@ def _index_row_to_card(row: dict, pick_slugs: set[str], mealie_public_url: str =
 
 
 def _const_eq(a: str, b: str) -> bool:
-    """Constant-time string compare for bearer-token validation. Audit
+    """Constant-time string compare for bearer-token validation. A
-    CVE-A3 (2026-05-02): the prior hand-rolled XOR loop early-returned
+    hand-rolled XOR loop that early-returns on length mismatch is
-    on length mismatch, which is itself a side-channel — an attacker
+    itself a side-channel — an attacker can probe the admin-bearer
-    can probe the admin-bearer length. hmac.compare_digest handles
+    length. hmac.compare_digest handles both length and content in
-    both length and content in constant time."""
+    constant time."""
     return hmac.compare_digest(a.encode(), b.encode())
 
 

cauldron/templates/discover.html

@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@
     // crafted scraped image_url could close the url(...) string and inject
     // arbitrary CSS rules into the discover grid. With <img src=...> the
     // URL stays in HTML-attribute context end-to-end and `_esc` is
-    // sufficient. Audit CVE-NEW3-2 fix (2026-05-02 PM 3rd-pass).
+    // sufficient.
     // Defense-in-depth: only render the image element if the URL parses
     // as a well-formed http(s) URL — anything else falls back to the
     // placeholder.

cauldron/templates/picks.html

@@ -55,10 +55,10 @@
 <script>
 // Delegated unpin listener — slug is read from the parent <li>'s
 // data-slug attribute (HTML-attribute context, autoescaped by Jinja),
-// never interpolated into a JS string literal inside HTML. Audit
+// never interpolated into a JS string literal inside HTML. The prior
-// CVE-NEW-2 fix 2026-05-02 PM: the prior `onclick="removePick('{{ slug }}',...)"`
+// `onclick="removePick('{{ slug }}',...)"` pattern was a stored-XSS
-// pattern was a stored-XSS surface because HTML attribute decoding
+// surface because HTML attribute decoding returns the bare `'` to the
-// returns the bare `'` to the JS engine.
+// JS engine.
 document.getElementById('picks-list')?.addEventListener('click', async (ev) => {
   const btn = ev.target.closest('.js-unpin');
   if (!btn) return;

compose.yml

@@ -9,17 +9,8 @@ services:
     container_name: cauldron
     restart: unless-stopped
     env_file:
-      - /srv/secrets/cauldron.env
+      # Point at wherever your secrets file lives. Override via .env at the
+      # compose root: `CAULDRON_ENV_FILE=/srv/secrets/cauldron.env`.
+      - ${CAULDRON_ENV_FILE:-./.env}
     ports:
-      # LAN-only. Same pattern as cwho on 7777.
+      - "${CAULDRON_BIND:-0.0.0.0}:${CAULDRON_PORT:-7790}:7790"
-      - "0.0.0.0:7790:7790"
-      - "127.0.0.1:7790:7790"
-    networks:
-      - sulkta
-      - backend-net
-
-networks:
-  sulkta:
-    external: true
-  backend-net:
-    external: true