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v1.0.0 ... main

Author SHA1 Message Date
524d831352 ci: add gitleaks workflow (Sulkta canonical)
All checks were successful
gitleaks / scan (push) Successful in 19s
2026-05-27 22:14:53 -07:00
7b9b09133b Public-flip audit: module URL + README humanization
git.sulkta.coop → git.sulkta.com (matches the live public Forgejo endpoint).
README dropped AI-agent positioning + emoji status table; kept all
technical content (DST, MuSig aggregation, exit codes, MCP tool table).
2026-05-27 11:29:05 -07:00
9d6c7cffbe v1.0.1: audit fixes — fetchCertRaw status check, .part cleanup, AVK guards, strict merkle, JSON error envelope
Independent code audit (in-repo, fresh-eyes pass) flagged 0 critical, 4
high, 8 medium, 7 low. This commit addresses all 4 highs + the JSON
error-path inconsistency + the vestigial verify.STM stub.

HIGH fixes:
- cmd/mithril-go/main.go fetchCertRaw: missing status check let HTML 4xx/5xx
  bodies fall through to confusing JSON-decode errors. Added explicit
  StatusCode>=400 check + 16 MiB response body cap + Accept header.
- internal/artifact/download.go: SHA mismatch left .part on disk, causing
  every retry to resume the corrupted bytes and fail SHA forever. Now
  removes .part on hash mismatch so the next attempt starts clean.
- internal/stm/types.go DecodeAVK: rejects total_stake=0 and nr_leaves=0
  at decode-time. internal/stm/lottery.go adds defensive guard for
  stake==0 || totalStake==0 to prevent big.Rat.SetFrac panic (DoS vector
  for the MCP server when fed crafted AVK).
- internal/stm/merkle.go: now requires (a) every proof value is exactly
  32 bytes, (b) indices are STRICTLY ascending (no duplicates),
  (c) every index is < nr_leaves, (d) all proof values are consumed by
  the algorithm. Prevents parser-differential bugs vs upstream Rust.

JSON error-path wiring:
- cmd/mithril-go/json.go: replaced unused emitJSONErr with failure() helper
  that routes errors to stdout-as-JSON when -json is set, else stderr-as-text.
  Error envelope shape: {error: {code, kind, message}} where 'kind' is a
  stable short string (network/integrity/verify/usage/internal) for agents
  to branch on without parsing human text.
- All -json-supporting commands (info, list, show, cert, verify+subcommands)
  now use failure() in error paths instead of bare fmt.Fprintln(stderr).
- Verified: 'verify -json deadbeef' on a bogus hash now emits valid JSON
  to stdout with exit=3, instead of empty stdout + text on stderr.

Vestigial code:
- internal/verify/verify.go: removed STM() stub + ErrSTMNotImplemented.
  Real STM verification has lived in internal/stm/verify.go since the
  crypto sprint; the stub was dead code from milestone-by-milestone work.

Verification (still all green):
- preprod chain: 90 certs, 1124 wins ✓
- mainnet head:  59 signers, 1972 wins ✓
- preprod head:   2 signers,   11 wins ✓
- preprod genesis: Ed25519 ✓
- JSON error envelope on bogus hash: well-formed JSON, exit=3
- internal/stm unit test: PASS

Audit findings deferred to v1.0.2+: bubble-sort in stm.Verify (medium,
perf only at scale); int-vs-uint64 truncation guards on 32-bit targets
(medium, won't bite on 64-bit); tar mode-bit masking (medium, low impact
since archives are from trusted aggregator); no User-Agent header on
aggregator requests (low, op nicety); MCP scanner silent stop on >10 MiB
line (low, defensive).
2026-04-23 17:30:34 -07:00
12 changed files with 226 additions and 164 deletions

View file

@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
# .forgejo/workflows/gitleaks.yml
#
# Sulkta canonical gitleaks workflow. Drop a copy into every public repo at
# `.forgejo/workflows/gitleaks.yml` after the Forgejo act_runner is registered
# (task #295).
#
# Pairs with the pre-receive hook installed on every bare repo — that one is
# the strict enforcement layer (rejects the push); this one provides the
# per-PR red ✗ that branch-protection rules can require before merge.
#
# Layer 1 (this workflow): visible per-PR status, can be a required check.
# Layer 2 (pre-receive hook): strict enforcement at the server.
# Layer 3 (johnny5 cron sweep): nightly full-history sweep across all repos.
name: gitleaks
on:
push:
pull_request:
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
# Full history — gitleaks needs depth to scan a commit range.
fetch-depth: 0
- name: install gitleaks
run: |
curl -sSL -o gl.tar.gz \
https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/download/v8.21.2/gitleaks_8.21.2_linux_x64.tar.gz
tar xzf gl.tar.gz gitleaks
chmod +x gitleaks
./gitleaks version
- name: scan
run: |
./gitleaks detect --source . --no-banner --redact --verbose

100
README.md
View file

@ -2,46 +2,38 @@
Pure-Go client for the Cardano [Mithril](https://mithril.network) protocol.
Mithril is Cardano's stake-based certified-snapshot system — it lets a new
node bootstrap the chain from a cryptographically-verified snapshot
instead of replaying every block from genesis.
Mithril is Cardano's stake-based certified-snapshot system. A new node
bootstraps the chain from a cryptographically-verified snapshot instead
of replaying every block from genesis.
The official [`mithril-client`](https://github.com/input-output-hk/mithril)
is Rust. `mithril-go` is a pure-Go reimplementation that produces a single
static binary with no CGo, no upstream Rust runtime, and an MCP-native
tool surface for AI agents — useful for:
- Embedding Mithril bootstrap into Go-based Cardano tooling (alongside
`gouroboros`, `dingo`, etc.)
- Constrained ARM/embedded targets where shipping the Rust binary + its
deps is overkill
- Operators who prefer a single `go install`-able helper
- AI agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Zed, ...) that want to verify Mithril
certs as a callable tool
The reference [`mithril-client`](https://github.com/input-output-hk/mithril)
is Rust. `mithril-go` is a pure-Go reimplementation: single static binary,
no CGo, no `blst`, no upstream Rust runtime. Also ships an MCP stdio
server for agent use.
## Status
**Working consensus-correct verification against live mainnet and preprod.**
Consensus-correct verification against live mainnet and preprod.
| Capability | Status |
|---|---|
| Aggregator REST client | ✅ list, show, cert, walk-chain |
| Resumable HTTP download (SHA hook + progress) | |
| Streamed zstd+tar extract (tar-slip defended) | |
| Genesis Ed25519 verification | ✅ live mainnet + preprod |
| STM BLS12-381 aggregate verification | ✅ live mainnet + preprod |
| Lottery-win threshold (Taylor series, big.Rat) | |
| Merkle batch-proof verification (Blake2b-256) | |
| AVK chaining + epoch + hash continuity | |
| **Full chain verification (genesis → head)** | ✅ live mainnet + preprod |
| Per-immutable SHA manifest verification | |
| MCP stdio server (8 tools) | |
| Full immutables-download loop (8000+ files) | |
| Aggregator REST client (list, show, cert, walk-chain) | done |
| Resumable HTTP download (SHA hook + progress) | done |
| Streamed zstd+tar extract (tar-slip defended) | done |
| Genesis Ed25519 verification | done |
| STM BLS12-381 aggregate verification | done |
| Lottery-win threshold (Taylor series, big.Rat) | done |
| Merkle batch-proof verification (Blake2b-256) | done |
| AVK chaining + epoch + hash continuity | done |
| Full chain verification (genesis → head) | done |
| Per-immutable SHA manifest verification | done |
| MCP stdio server (8 tools) | done |
| Full immutables-download loop (8000+ files) | pending |
## Quick start
```bash
go build ./cmd/mithril-go # produces a 9.5 MB single static binary
go build ./cmd/mithril-go # ~9.5 MB single static binary
mithril-go info -network mainnet
mithril-go list -network mainnet
@ -79,27 +71,24 @@ internal/
verify/ Genesis Ed25519 verification
```
## What was non-obvious (so future-you doesn't have to dig)
Three things in the upstream Rust that aren't documented anywhere
prominent:
## Upstream details that aren't documented
1. **DST is empty.** Mithril's BLS hash-to-G1 uses an empty domain
separation tag, not the IETF standard `BLS_SIG_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_NUL_`.
The Rust calls `blst.verify(sig, msg, &[], &[], pk, ...)` — the
`&[]` is the empty DST.
2. **The signed message is `signed_message_bytes || mt_root_bytes`**,
separation tag, not the IETF standard
`BLS_SIG_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_NUL_`. The Rust calls
`blst.verify(sig, msg, &[], &[], pk, ...)` — the `&[]` is the empty DST.
2. **Signed message is `signed_message_bytes || mt_root_bytes`**,
not `signed_message` alone. The Merkle commitment root is appended
before BLS verify.
3. **Aggregation is MuSig-style scalar-weighted, not plain.**
3. **Aggregation is MuSig-style scalar-weighted**, not plain.
`t_i = Blake2b-128(Blake2b-128(σ_0‖…‖σ_{n-1}) ‖ be_u64(i))`,
then `aggr_sig = Σ t_i·sig_i` and `aggr_vk = Σ t_i·vk_i`.
Plain summation does not interop with blst.
Plus the `protocol_message` hash is SHA-256 over key-then-value, with
keys ordered by **Rust enum declaration order**, not alphabetical.
The `protocol_message` hash is SHA-256 over key-then-value, with keys
ordered by **Rust enum declaration order**, not alphabetical.
## Machine / LLM usage
## JSON + exit codes
Every query command accepts `-json`:
@ -119,12 +108,11 @@ Stable exit codes:
| 5 | signature verification failure (genesis or STM) |
| 130 | canceled (SIGINT) |
These are the contract — existing codes won't renumber.
Existing codes won't renumber.
### MCP server
## MCP server
`mithril-go mcp` brings up a Model Context Protocol stdio server.
Compatible with any MCP client (Claude Code, Cursor, Zed, custom agents).
Tools exposed:
@ -135,15 +123,9 @@ Tools exposed:
| `mithril_show_snapshot` | Detail for a snapshot (or `latest`) |
| `mithril_get_certificate` | Cert by hash (or `head`) |
| `mithril_walk_cert_chain` | Walk previous_hash from head to genesis |
| `mithril_verify_certificate` | Ed25519 OR STM BLS verify, dispatched by cert kind |
| `mithril_verify_certificate` | Ed25519 or STM BLS verify, dispatched by cert kind |
| `mithril_verify_chain` | Full chain verify with per-step report |
| `mithril_verify_genesis` | Walk to genesis + Ed25519 verify (legacy single-purpose tool) |
Example agent flow:
```
agent: tools/call mithril_verify_chain {network: mainnet}
→ {verified: true, length: 89, genesis_hash: "...", steps: [...]}
```
| `mithril_verify_genesis` | Walk to genesis + Ed25519 verify |
## Dependencies
@ -165,14 +147,14 @@ go test -tags live ./... # hits live preprod aggregator
## Verified against live networks (latest run)
```
mainnet chain 89 STM + 1 genesis
mainnet head 59 signers, 1972 wins
mainnet genesis Ed25519
preprod chain 89 STM + 1 genesis
preprod head 2 signers, 11 wins
preprod genesis Ed25519
mainnet chain 89 STM + 1 genesis ok
mainnet head 59 signers, 1972 wins ok
mainnet genesis Ed25519 ok
preprod chain 89 STM + 1 genesis ok
preprod head 2 signers, 11 wins ok
preprod genesis Ed25519 ok
```
## License
Apache-2.0. See `LICENSE`. Matches the upstream Mithril project.
Apache-2.0. See `LICENSE`. Matches upstream Mithril.

View file

@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package main
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
)
@ -19,12 +18,39 @@ func emitJSON(v any) int {
return 0
}
// emitJSONErr writes a structured error envelope. Mirrors the shape
// Claude/MCP-friendly consumers want: {"error": {"code":..., "message":...}}.
func emitJSONErr(w io.Writer, code, msg string) {
enc := json.NewEncoder(w)
// emitJSONErr writes a structured error envelope to stdout in the shape
// MCP / agent consumers expect:
//
// {"error": {"code": "...", "message": "..."}}
//
// Returns the supplied exit code so callers can do `return emitJSONErr(...)`.
func emitJSONErr(code int, kind, msg string) int {
enc := json.NewEncoder(os.Stdout)
enc.SetIndent("", " ")
_ = enc.Encode(map[string]any{
"error": map[string]string{"code": code, "message": msg},
"error": map[string]any{
"code": code,
"kind": kind,
"message": msg,
},
})
return code
}
// failure routes an error to either stdout-as-JSON (when the user passed
// -json) or stderr-as-text (default). Returns the supplied exit code.
//
// kind is a stable short string ("network", "integrity", "verify",
// "usage", "internal") — agents can branch on this without parsing
// human-readable text.
func failure(asJSON bool, code int, kind, prefix string, err error) int {
msg := err.Error()
if prefix != "" {
msg = prefix + ": " + msg
}
if asJSON {
return emitJSONErr(code, kind, msg)
}
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, msg)
return code
}

View file

@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import (
"encoding/json"
"flag"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"os"
"os/signal"
@ -24,17 +25,17 @@ import (
"text/tabwriter"
"time"
"git.sulkta.coop/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/aggregator"
"git.sulkta.coop/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/artifact"
"git.sulkta.coop/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/chain"
"git.sulkta.coop/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/manifest"
"git.sulkta.coop/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/mcp"
"git.sulkta.coop/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/networks"
"git.sulkta.coop/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/stm"
"git.sulkta.coop/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/verify"
"git.sulkta.com/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/aggregator"
"git.sulkta.com/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/artifact"
"git.sulkta.com/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/chain"
"git.sulkta.com/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/manifest"
"git.sulkta.com/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/mcp"
"git.sulkta.com/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/networks"
"git.sulkta.com/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/stm"
"git.sulkta.com/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/verify"
)
const version = "0.0.3-dev"
const version = "1.0.1"
// Stable exit codes. Any addition goes at the end; existing values
// don't renumber. LLM/automation-friendly contract.
@ -132,14 +133,12 @@ func cmdList(ctx context.Context, args []string) int {
asJSON := fs.Bool("json", false, "emit structured JSON")
n, _, err := resolveNetwork(fs, args)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
return 2
return failure(*asJSON, exitUsage, "usage", "", err)
}
c := aggregator.New(n.AggregatorURL)
snaps, err := c.ListCardanoDBSnapshots(ctx)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "list:", err)
return exitNetwork
return failure(*asJSON, exitNetwork, "network", "list", err)
}
if *asJSON {
return emitJSON(map[string]any{
@ -167,8 +166,7 @@ func cmdShow(ctx context.Context, args []string) int {
asJSON := fs.Bool("json", false, "emit structured JSON")
n, rest, err := resolveNetwork(fs, args)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
return exitUsage
return failure(*asJSON, exitUsage, "usage", "", err)
}
hash := "latest"
if len(rest) > 0 {
@ -177,8 +175,7 @@ func cmdShow(ctx context.Context, args []string) int {
c := aggregator.New(n.AggregatorURL)
snap, err := resolveSnapshot(ctx, c, hash)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "show:", err)
return exitNetwork
return failure(*asJSON, exitNetwork, "network", "show", err)
}
if *asJSON {
return emitJSON(snap)
@ -282,12 +279,11 @@ func cmdVerify(ctx context.Context, args []string) int {
asJSON := fs.Bool("json", false, "emit structured JSON")
n, rest, err := resolveNetwork(fs, args)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
return exitUsage
return failure(*asJSON, exitUsage, "usage", "", err)
}
if len(rest) == 0 {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "verify: cert hash required (or 'head' / 'genesis')")
return exitUsage
return failure(*asJSON, exitUsage, "usage", "",
fmt.Errorf("verify: cert hash required (or 'head' / 'genesis' / 'chain' / 'manifest <dir>')"))
}
mode := rest[0] // "head" = verify head cert (STM, not yet), "genesis" = walk chain + verify genesis, or a specific hash
c := aggregator.New(n.AggregatorURL)
@ -309,24 +305,21 @@ func cmdVerify(ctx context.Context, args []string) int {
func runVerifyManifest(args []string, asJSON bool) int {
if len(args) == 0 {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "verify manifest: needs path to download dir (with digests/ + db/)")
return exitUsage
return failure(asJSON, exitUsage, "usage", "",
fmt.Errorf("verify manifest: needs path to download dir (with digests/ + db/)"))
}
dir := args[0]
digestsPath, err := manifest.LocateDigests(filepath.Join(dir, "digests"))
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "locate digests.json:", err)
return exitGeneric
return failure(asJSON, exitGeneric, "internal", "locate digests.json", err)
}
entries, err := manifest.Load(digestsPath)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "load manifest:", err)
return exitIntegrity
return failure(asJSON, exitIntegrity, "integrity", "load manifest", err)
}
res, err := manifest.Verify(entries, filepath.Join(dir, "db"))
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "verify manifest:", err)
return exitGeneric
return failure(asJSON, exitGeneric, "internal", "verify manifest", err)
}
if asJSON {
code := emitJSON(res)
@ -349,13 +342,11 @@ func runVerifyChain(ctx context.Context, n networks.Network, asJSON bool) int {
c := aggregator.New(n.AggregatorURL)
snap, err := resolveSnapshot(ctx, c, "latest")
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "resolve:", err)
return exitNetwork
return failure(asJSON, exitNetwork, "network", "resolve", err)
}
res, err := chain.Verify(ctx, nil, n, snap.CertificateHash, 2048)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "chain verify:", err)
return exitNetwork
return failure(asJSON, exitNetwork, "network", "chain verify", err)
}
if asJSON {
code := emitJSON(res)
@ -390,22 +381,19 @@ func runVerifyGenesis(ctx context.Context, c *aggregator.Client, n networks.Netw
// Find the head snapshot's cert, walk to genesis, verify Ed25519 on the genesis cert.
snap, err := resolveSnapshot(ctx, c, "latest")
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "resolve:", err)
return exitNetwork
return failure(asJSON, exitNetwork, "network", "resolve", err)
}
chain, err := c.CertChain(ctx, snap.CertificateHash, 2048)
certs, err := c.CertChain(ctx, snap.CertificateHash, 2048)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "chain:", err)
return exitNetwork
return failure(asJSON, exitNetwork, "network", "chain", err)
}
if len(chain) == 0 {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "empty chain")
return exitGeneric
if len(certs) == 0 {
return failure(asJSON, exitGeneric, "internal", "", fmt.Errorf("empty chain"))
}
gen := chain[len(chain)-1]
gen := certs[len(certs)-1]
if gen.GenesisSignature == "" {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "tail of chain is not a genesis certificate")
return exitGeneric
return failure(asJSON, exitGeneric, "internal", "",
fmt.Errorf("tail of chain is not a genesis certificate"))
}
return verifyGenesisCert(n, gen, asJSON)
}
@ -413,8 +401,7 @@ func runVerifyGenesis(ctx context.Context, c *aggregator.Client, n networks.Netw
func runVerifyHead(ctx context.Context, c *aggregator.Client, n networks.Network, asJSON bool) int {
snap, err := resolveSnapshot(ctx, c, "latest")
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "resolve:", err)
return exitNetwork
return failure(asJSON, exitNetwork, "network", "resolve", err)
}
return runVerifySingle(ctx, c, n, snap.CertificateHash, asJSON)
}
@ -422,8 +409,7 @@ func runVerifyHead(ctx context.Context, c *aggregator.Client, n networks.Network
func runVerifySingle(ctx context.Context, c *aggregator.Client, n networks.Network, hash string, asJSON bool) int {
cert, err := c.GetCertificate(ctx, hash)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "cert:", err)
return exitNetwork
return failure(asJSON, exitNetwork, "network", "cert", err)
}
if cert.GenesisSignature != "" {
return verifyGenesisCert(n, cert, asJSON)
@ -438,18 +424,15 @@ func verifySTMCert(ctx context.Context, c *aggregator.Client, n networks.Network
// Re-fetch as raw JSON to access the AVK + params fields.
raw, err := fetchCertRaw(ctx, n.AggregatorURL, hash)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "fetch raw cert:", err)
return exitNetwork
return failure(asJSON, exitNetwork, "network", "fetch raw cert", err)
}
ms, err := stm.DecodeMultiSig(raw.MultiSignature)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "decode multi_signature:", err)
return exitIntegrity
return failure(asJSON, exitIntegrity, "integrity", "decode multi_signature", err)
}
avk, err := stm.DecodeAVK(raw.AggregateVerificationKey)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "decode avk:", err)
return exitIntegrity
return failure(asJSON, exitIntegrity, "integrity", "decode avk", err)
}
msg := []byte(cert.SignedMessage)
params := stm.Parameters{K: raw.Metadata.Parameters.K, M: raw.Metadata.Parameters.M, PhiF: raw.Metadata.Parameters.PhiF}
@ -501,14 +484,21 @@ func fetchCertRaw(ctx context.Context, aggregatorURL, hash string) (*rawCert, er
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode >= 400 {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 2048))
return nil, fmt.Errorf("aggregator GET /certificate/%s: %d: %s", hash, resp.StatusCode, string(body))
}
// Cap at 16 MiB — current mainnet cert JSON is well under 100 KiB.
limited := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 16<<20)
var r rawCert
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&r); err != nil {
return nil, err
if err := json.NewDecoder(limited).Decode(&r); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode cert json: %w", err)
}
return &r, nil
}
@ -516,8 +506,7 @@ func fetchCertRaw(ctx context.Context, aggregatorURL, hash string) (*rawCert, er
func verifyGenesisCert(n networks.Network, cert *aggregator.Certificate, asJSON bool) int {
vk, err := verify.DecodeGenesisVerifyKey(n.GenesisVerifyKey)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "decode genesis key:", err)
return exitGeneric
return failure(asJSON, exitGeneric, "internal", "decode genesis key", err)
}
err = verify.GenesisFromJSON(vk, cert.SignedMessage, cert.GenesisSignature, cert.ProtocolMessage)
if asJSON {
@ -552,28 +541,25 @@ func cmdCert(ctx context.Context, args []string) int {
asJSON := fs.Bool("json", false, "emit structured JSON")
n, rest, err := resolveNetwork(fs, args)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
return exitUsage
return failure(*asJSON, exitUsage, "usage", "", err)
}
if len(rest) == 0 {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "cert: hash required (or 'head' to use the latest snapshot's cert_hash)")
return exitUsage
return failure(*asJSON, exitUsage, "usage", "",
fmt.Errorf("cert: hash required (or 'head' to use the latest snapshot's cert_hash)"))
}
head := rest[0]
c := aggregator.New(n.AggregatorURL)
if head == "head" {
snap, err := resolveSnapshot(ctx, c, "latest")
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "resolve head:", err)
return exitNetwork
return failure(*asJSON, exitNetwork, "network", "resolve head", err)
}
head = snap.CertificateHash
}
if *chain {
certs, err := c.CertChain(ctx, head, *maxDepth)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "chain:", err)
return exitNetwork
return failure(*asJSON, exitNetwork, "network", "chain", err)
}
if *asJSON {
return emitJSON(map[string]any{"chain_length": len(certs), "certs": certs})
@ -591,8 +577,7 @@ func cmdCert(ctx context.Context, args []string) int {
}
cert, err := c.GetCertificate(ctx, head)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "cert:", err)
return exitNetwork
return failure(*asJSON, exitNetwork, "network", "cert", err)
}
if *asJSON {
return emitJSON(cert)
@ -619,8 +604,7 @@ func cmdInfo(args []string) int {
asJSON := fs.Bool("json", false, "emit structured JSON")
n, _, err := resolveNetwork(fs, args)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
return exitUsage
return failure(*asJSON, exitUsage, "usage", "", err)
}
if *asJSON {
return emitJSON(map[string]any{

View file

@ -4,12 +4,12 @@ import (
"context"
"fmt"
"git.sulkta.coop/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/aggregator"
"git.sulkta.coop/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/chain"
"git.sulkta.coop/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/mcp"
"git.sulkta.coop/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/networks"
"git.sulkta.coop/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/stm"
"git.sulkta.coop/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/verify"
"git.sulkta.com/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/aggregator"
"git.sulkta.com/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/chain"
"git.sulkta.com/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/mcp"
"git.sulkta.com/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/networks"
"git.sulkta.com/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/stm"
"git.sulkta.com/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/verify"
)
func errString(e error) string {

2
go.mod
View file

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
module git.sulkta.coop/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go
module git.sulkta.com/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go
go 1.26

View file

@ -121,6 +121,10 @@ func Download(ctx context.Context, uri, destPath, expectedSHA256 string, progres
if expectedSHA256 != "" {
got := hex.EncodeToString(h.Sum(nil))
if got != expectedSHA256 {
// Remove the .part file — leaving it behind would cause every
// subsequent retry to resume from the same corrupted bytes and
// fail SHA again indefinitely.
_ = os.Remove(partPath)
return fmt.Errorf("SHA256 mismatch: want %s, got %s", expectedSHA256, got)
}
}

View file

@ -24,10 +24,10 @@ import (
"io"
"net/http"
"git.sulkta.coop/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/aggregator"
"git.sulkta.coop/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/networks"
"git.sulkta.coop/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/stm"
"git.sulkta.coop/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/verify"
"git.sulkta.com/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/aggregator"
"git.sulkta.com/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/networks"
"git.sulkta.com/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/stm"
"git.sulkta.com/Sulkta-Coop/mithril-go/internal/verify"
)
// Step is the per-cert record in a chain-verification report.

View file

@ -58,6 +58,12 @@ func IsLotteryWon(phiF float64, ev [64]byte, stake, totalStake uint64) bool {
if math.Abs(phiF-1.0) < 1e-15 {
return true
}
// Defensive: zero-stake or zero-total-stake produces nonsense (and
// totalStake==0 would panic at SetFrac). Guard at the lottery layer
// in addition to AVK-decode-time validation.
if stake == 0 || totalStake == 0 {
return false
}
// ev as big int (LE interpretation)
evInt := evAsBigInt(ev)

View file

@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
"bytes"
"encoding/binary"
"fmt"
"sort"
"golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b"
)
@ -78,16 +77,31 @@ func VerifyMerkleBatch(root []byte, nrLeaves int, leafValues [][]byte, indices [
if len(leafValues) != len(indices) {
return fmt.Errorf("leaves/indices count mismatch: %d vs %d", len(leafValues), len(indices))
}
// Must be sorted ascending
if nrLeaves <= 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("nrLeaves must be positive, got %d", nrLeaves)
}
// Validate every proof node is a 32-byte BLAKE2b-256 digest. Anything
// shorter or longer is malformed and Rust would reject it.
for i, v := range proofValues {
if len(v) != 32 {
return fmt.Errorf("proof value [%d]: got %d bytes, want 32", i, len(v))
}
}
// Indices must be strictly ascending — duplicates would create
// double-claiming under the same leaf and the algorithm doesn't expect
// them. (Rust uses sort_unstable + equality compare against the input;
// equivalent to "non-decreasing" but doesn't reject equal-adjacent.
// We're stricter than upstream here on purpose.)
ordered := make([]int, len(indices))
for i, v := range indices {
if v >= uint64(nrLeaves) {
return fmt.Errorf("index [%d]=%d out of range (nr_leaves=%d)", i, v, nrLeaves)
}
ordered[i] = int(v)
}
sortedCopy := append([]int(nil), ordered...)
sort.Ints(sortedCopy)
for i := range ordered {
if ordered[i] != sortedCopy[i] {
return fmt.Errorf("indices not sorted ascending: %v", indices)
for i := 1; i < len(ordered); i++ {
if ordered[i] <= ordered[i-1] {
return fmt.Errorf("indices not strictly ascending at [%d]: %v", i, indices)
}
}
@ -155,6 +169,12 @@ func VerifyMerkleBatch(root []byte, nrLeaves int, leafValues [][]byte, indices [
if len(currentLayer) != 1 {
return fmt.Errorf("verification ended with %d nodes, want 1", len(currentLayer))
}
// All proof values must be consumed. Trailing bytes mean the proof
// shipped extra nodes the algorithm didn't need — likely malformed
// or attacker-padded.
if len(values) > 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("proof has %d unconsumed values — malformed", len(values))
}
if !bytes.Equal(currentLayer[0], root) {
return fmt.Errorf("root mismatch: got %x, want %x", currentLayer[0], root)
}

View file

@ -16,8 +16,7 @@
// 4. Lottery check: for each (index, sigma), evaluate_dense_mapping < threshold(stake)
// 5. Threshold: total distinct lottery wins >= k
//
// Phases 2-5 are stubbed in verify.go pending the BLS crypto sprint.
// This package's current role is rock-solid decoding.
// Phases 2-5 are implemented in verify.go (BLS, lottery, Merkle, threshold).
package stm
import (
@ -116,6 +115,12 @@ func DecodeAVK(rawJSON []byte) (*AVK, error) {
if len(wire.MTCommitment.Root) != 32 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AVK root: got %d bytes, want 32", len(wire.MTCommitment.Root))
}
if wire.TotalStake == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AVK total_stake is zero")
}
if wire.MTCommitment.NrLeaves == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AVK nr_leaves is zero")
}
return &AVK{
MerkleRoot: wire.MTCommitment.Root,
NumLeaves: wire.MTCommitment.NrLeaves,

View file

@ -7,8 +7,8 @@
// 2. Subsequent certificates carry an STM (Stake-based Threshold Multi-
// signature) aggregate signature over BLS12-381.
//
// Ed25519 (genesis) verification is fully implemented here. STM verification
// is stubbed pending the BLS crypto sprint.
// Ed25519 (genesis) verification lives here. STM BLS verification is in
// the sibling internal/stm package.
package verify
import (
@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ var (
ErrNotGenesis = errors.New("certificate is not a genesis certificate")
ErrBadSignature = errors.New("genesis signature verification failed")
ErrSignedMessageHash = errors.New("signed_message does not match SHA256(protocol_message)")
ErrSTMNotImplemented = errors.New("STM signature verification not implemented yet")
)
// The Mithril enum order on ProtocolMessagePartKey — BTreeMap iteration
@ -182,9 +181,5 @@ func GenesisFromJSON(verifyKey ed25519.PublicKey, signedMessageHex, genesisSigna
return Genesis(verifyKey, signedMessageHex, genesisSignatureHex, pm)
}
// STM verifies a non-genesis certificate's aggregate BLS signature.
// Stub — target is Mithril STM paper §5 (signing) + §6 (aggregation)
// using gnark-crypto's bls12-381 primitives.
func STM(protocolMessageJSON, multiSignature []byte, avk any) error {
return ErrSTMNotImplemented
}
// STM verification lives in the sibling internal/stm package — see
// stm.Verify(). This file is genesis-Ed25519-only.