torttube

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Sulkta 6813b27bb5 Second audit fix sprint — 2 CRIT + 5 HIGH + 5 MED Second adversarial Opus audit found 2 CRIT + 7 HIGH + 9 MED + 9 LOW against HEAD `2b948d7`. This sprint lands all CRIT, the 5 highest-value HIGH items, and the most impactful MEDs. Remaining items deferred (see notes at end). CRIT-1 (race + torn write on Watch Later / search-history JSON state): The persistence layer was load->mutate->save with plain open(w). Two real failure modes were live: - Lost-update race: phone fires two RunPlugin wl_add back-to-back, each in a fresh Python interpreter. Interpreter A reads [], inserts AAA, writes [AAA]; B was already past _load_watch_later (also read []) and writes [BBB] — AAA lost. - Torn-write loss: open(w) truncates immediately. Kodi crash / Pi yank between truncate and json.dump finish leaves a zero-byte or partial file. _load* catches JSONDecodeError and returns [], silently wiping the user's pinned-videos list on next read. Fix: _atomic_write_json (mkstemp + fsync + os.replace) + _with_lock (fcntl.flock on a sibling .lock file). All four persistence functions (_record_search, _clear_search_history, _add_to_watch_later, _remove_from_watch_later) refactored to wrap load->mutate->save under the lock. os.replace is atomic on POSIX same-filesystem; flock is per-process advisory across the concurrent plugin interpreters. CRIT-2 (rip allowlist bypass via ..): RIP_DEST_ALLOWLIST check was string-level starts_with. '/storage/.kodi/temp/../../etc/cron.d' passed the allowlist but escaped to anywhere. Dormant op (no Python caller today) but the protocol is a wide-open arbitrary-write primitive under the sidecar UID (root on LibreELEC). Fix: literal-prefix check first (cheap reject), then create_dir_all + tokio::fs::canonicalize, then a second check against the same allowlist on the canonical result. Defeats .. and symlink escape. HIGH-1 (SponsorBlock 1 MiB cap was post-hoc): The cap from the first audit landed AFTER resp.bytes().await — which buffers the entire body unbounded. A hostile mirror returning multi-GB would OOM the Pi before the cap fired. Fix: stream via resp.chunk() in a loop, bail as soon as accumulated bytes > cap. Defends OOM during ingest, not after. HIGH-2 (Container.Refresh fires in wrong context): _wl_remove_action unconditionally fired Refresh. Future refactors that expose the Remove context menu outside the Watch Later listing (or stale context-menu state across navigation) would refresh the wrong container — search results would reload pointlessly when the user just hit Remove in WL. Fix: only Refresh when Container.FolderPath contains 'action=watch_later'. HIGH-3 (thumbnail shape — promoted from first-audit MED-9): The new Watch Later code persists rustypipe Player.details which has a thumbnail string in many versions. _pick_thumbnail called max() on a string — iterates chars and crashes with AttributeError on the .get lookup. Live crash-on-render of Watch Later. Fix: _pick_thumbnail now accepts Any and dispatches on isinstance: empty/None -> '', str -> str, dict -> .url, list -> filter for dicts then max-by-area. HIGH-4 (search query unvalidated — length, control chars, surrogates): Search took an arbitrary string from the addon and shipped it to rustypipe. Three failure modes: - 10 MB query allocates 10 MB on stdin pipe + another 10 MB in serde_json::from_str + materializes in rustypipe's HTTP call. ~30 MB blip per request on the 1 GB Pi. - Newlines in query produce multi-line entries in tracing::info!(query, ...) — log injection (mild on this stack, but obfuscates real entries). - Lone UTF-16 surrogates aren't a crash but produce a confusing error path. Fix: validate_query() at the sidecar dispatch — 2 KB length cap, reject control chars (TAB allowed since YouTube treats it as whitespace). Addon-side _record_search now also collapses whitespace via ' '.join(query.split()). MED-1 (clear_history flicker): _clear_history_action finalized with succeeded=True THEN Container.Update — caused a half-tick of empty directory before the nav replaced it. Fix: succeeded=False first, then the replace navigates cleanly. MED-3 (LibreELEC-only fallback): _addon_data_path's xbmcvfs fallback hardcoded /storage/.kodi/userdata/... — non-existent on Linux desktop Kodi etc. Fix: fall back to ~/.kodi/userdata/addon_data/... which is portable. Tests + dev rigs now persist correctly. MED-4 (Response::ok clobber): Added debug_assert! so any future op returning its own 'ok' key is caught in debug builds. Not a fix per se — but a tripwire. MED-5 (codec regex single-quote): Made _MIME_CODEC_RE accept either quote style. Belt-and-braces against upstream MIME format drift. MED-8 (SponsorBlockMonitor orphaned across plugin boundary): When we delegate to plugin.video.youtube, our monitor runs in our plugin's context against xbmc.Player()'s global state. If the user starts a different video mid-monitor, the segments are for the old one — would spuriously skip the new content. Fix: capture player.getPlayingFile() at start, bail if it changes mid-loop. MED-9 / LOW-2 carried over from first audit and tracked here too. Smoke-verified via JSON-RPC (browse-only, no playback, someone still watching the TV): - 3000-byte query rejected: 'query too long: 3000 bytes (cap 2048)' - newline-in-query rejected: 'query contains control characters' - legit search returns expected results - wl_add + watch_later directory renders without thumbnail crash Remaining deferred (cosmetic / no current impact): - MED-2 (WL staleness): accept for v0.1, add lazy refresh later - MED-6 (byte-length validate_youtube_id error message): cosmetic - MED-7 (_lan_ip multi-NIC): not currently a problem on the family LAN, document and revisit if Tailscale lands on the Pi - LOW-1..9: defensive polish, no real risk - First-audit's deferred MED/LOWs: still defer-able Addon v0.0.16.	2026-05-23 12:52:49 -07:00
..
plugin.video.torttube	Second audit fix sprint — 2 CRIT + 5 HIGH + 5 MED	2026-05-23 12:52:49 -07:00

Sulkta 6813b27bb5 Second audit fix sprint — 2 CRIT + 5 HIGH + 5 MED

Second adversarial Opus audit found 2 CRIT + 7 HIGH + 9 MED + 9 LOW
against HEAD 2b948d7. This sprint lands all CRIT, the 5 highest-value
HIGH items, and the most impactful MEDs. Remaining items deferred (see
notes at end).

CRIT-1 (race + torn write on Watch Later / search-history JSON state):
The persistence layer was load->mutate->save with plain open(w). Two
real failure modes were live:
  - Lost-update race: phone fires two RunPlugin wl_add back-to-back,
    each in a fresh Python interpreter. Interpreter A reads [], inserts
    AAA, writes [AAA]; B was already past _load_watch_later (also read
    []) and writes [BBB] — AAA lost.
  - Torn-write loss: open(w) truncates immediately. Kodi crash / Pi
    yank between truncate and json.dump finish leaves a zero-byte or
    partial file. _load* catches JSONDecodeError and returns [],
    silently wiping the user's pinned-videos list on next read.
Fix: _atomic_write_json (mkstemp + fsync + os.replace) + _with_lock
(fcntl.flock on a sibling .lock file). All four persistence functions
(_record_search, _clear_search_history, _add_to_watch_later,
_remove_from_watch_later) refactored to wrap load->mutate->save under
the lock. os.replace is atomic on POSIX same-filesystem; flock is
per-process advisory across the concurrent plugin interpreters.

CRIT-2 (rip allowlist bypass via ..): RIP_DEST_ALLOWLIST check was
string-level starts_with. '/storage/.kodi/temp/../../etc/cron.d' passed
the allowlist but escaped to anywhere. Dormant op (no Python caller
today) but the protocol is a wide-open arbitrary-write primitive
under the sidecar UID (root on LibreELEC). Fix: literal-prefix check
first (cheap reject), then create_dir_all + tokio::fs::canonicalize,
then a second check against the same allowlist on the canonical
result. Defeats .. and symlink escape.

HIGH-1 (SponsorBlock 1 MiB cap was post-hoc): The cap from the first
audit landed AFTER resp.bytes().await — which buffers the entire body
unbounded. A hostile mirror returning multi-GB would OOM the Pi before
the cap fired. Fix: stream via resp.chunk() in a loop, bail as soon as
accumulated bytes > cap. Defends OOM during ingest, not after.

HIGH-2 (Container.Refresh fires in wrong context): _wl_remove_action
unconditionally fired Refresh. Future refactors that expose the Remove
context menu outside the Watch Later listing (or stale context-menu
state across navigation) would refresh the wrong container — search
results would reload pointlessly when the user just hit Remove in WL.
Fix: only Refresh when Container.FolderPath contains
'action=watch_later'.

HIGH-3 (thumbnail shape — promoted from first-audit MED-9): The new
Watch Later code persists rustypipe Player.details which has a
thumbnail string in many versions. _pick_thumbnail called max() on a
string — iterates chars and crashes with AttributeError on the .get
lookup. Live crash-on-render of Watch Later. Fix: _pick_thumbnail now
accepts Any and dispatches on isinstance: empty/None -> '', str ->
str, dict -> .url, list -> filter for dicts then max-by-area.

HIGH-4 (search query unvalidated — length, control chars, surrogates):
Search took an arbitrary string from the addon and shipped it to
rustypipe. Three failure modes:
  - 10 MB query allocates 10 MB on stdin pipe + another 10 MB in
    serde_json::from_str + materializes in rustypipe's HTTP call. ~30
    MB blip per request on the 1 GB Pi.
  - Newlines in query produce multi-line entries in
    tracing::info!(query, ...) — log injection (mild on this stack,
    but obfuscates real entries).
  - Lone UTF-16 surrogates aren't a crash but produce a confusing
    error path.
Fix: validate_query() at the sidecar dispatch — 2 KB length cap,
reject control chars (TAB allowed since YouTube treats it as
whitespace). Addon-side _record_search now also collapses whitespace
via ' '.join(query.split()).

MED-1 (clear_history flicker): _clear_history_action finalized with
succeeded=True THEN Container.Update — caused a half-tick of empty
directory before the nav replaced it. Fix: succeeded=False first,
then the replace navigates cleanly.

MED-3 (LibreELEC-only fallback): _addon_data_path's xbmcvfs fallback
hardcoded /storage/.kodi/userdata/... — non-existent on Linux desktop
Kodi etc. Fix: fall back to ~/.kodi/userdata/addon_data/... which is
portable. Tests + dev rigs now persist correctly.

MED-4 (Response::ok clobber): Added debug_assert! so any future op
returning its own 'ok' key is caught in debug builds. Not a fix
per se — but a tripwire.

MED-5 (codec regex single-quote): Made _MIME_CODEC_RE accept either
quote style. Belt-and-braces against upstream MIME format drift.

MED-8 (SponsorBlockMonitor orphaned across plugin boundary): When we
delegate to plugin.video.youtube, our monitor runs in our plugin's
context against xbmc.Player()'s global state. If the user starts a
different video mid-monitor, the segments are for the old one — would
spuriously skip the new content. Fix: capture player.getPlayingFile()
at start, bail if it changes mid-loop.

MED-9 / LOW-2 carried over from first audit and tracked here too.

Smoke-verified via JSON-RPC (browse-only, no playback, someone still
watching the TV):
- 3000-byte query rejected: 'query too long: 3000 bytes (cap 2048)'
- newline-in-query rejected: 'query contains control characters'
- legit search returns expected results
- wl_add + watch_later directory renders without thumbnail crash

Remaining deferred (cosmetic / no current impact):
- MED-2 (WL staleness): accept for v0.1, add lazy refresh later
- MED-6 (byte-length validate_youtube_id error message): cosmetic
- MED-7 (_lan_ip multi-NIC): not currently a problem on the family
  LAN, document and revisit if Tailscale lands on the Pi
- LOW-1..9: defensive polish, no real risk
- First-audit's deferred MED/LOWs: still defer-able

Addon v0.0.16.

2026-05-23 12:52:49 -07:00

plugin.video.torttube Second audit fix sprint — 2 CRIT + 5 HIGH + 5 MED 2026-05-23 12:52:49 -07:00