Cobb requested all the small ones land before LAN testing.
discover.html CVE-NEW3-2 (LOW): switched recipe card image from a CSS
background-image:url('${_esc(url)}') to a plain <img class="img" src=...>
element. Recipe image_url is scraped from JSON-LD on third-party pages —
a malicious page could return an image_url crafted to close the CSS
url(...) string and inject layout-breaking CSS. With <img src=...> the
URL stays in HTML-attribute context end-to-end where _esc is sufficient.
Also adds defense-in-depth: validate URL parses as http(s) before
rendering, fall through to placeholder otherwise, and set
referrerpolicy=no-referrer so we don't leak our path to image hosts.
CSS for .dcard .img widened with object-fit:cover so img and div both
center/cover correctly.
server.py CVE-NEW3-3 (LOW): _origin_of() now lowercases scheme AND
host (urlparse only does scheme), and drops scheme-default ports
(:80/:443) so `https://x.com:443` matches `https://x.com`. Closes a
false-reject path on browsers that preserve case in Origin headers,
or non-canonical CAULDRON_BASE_URL values. Not a bypass — false-reject
robustness only — but cheap to fix and operationally important.
server.py CODE3-3 (LOW): _safe_next() now allows `%` in the path
charset so percent-encoded paths (e.g. /recipes/spaghetti%20bol)
don't silently land at /me. Defense-in-depth: also percent-decode
the path and reject if the decoded form contains `..` traversal or
`//` (encoded forms of the same patterns the front-of-function
reject already).
server.py INFO3-2: auth_callback now does session.clear() before
setting session["user"]. Capture+revalidate `next` BEFORE the clear
so we don't drop our own redirect target. Drops every pre-auth key
on login — defense-in-depth against session-state contamination if
anything else ever lands in pre-auth session.
.env.example INFO3-1: added CAULDRON_ADMIN_SUBS, CAULDRON_BASE_URL,
CAULDRON_BEHIND_TLS, CAULDRON_TRUSTED_PROXIES with comments
explaining what each one gates. Defaults are the safe-LAN set.
Holding for public deploy — Cobb running LAN tests for a few days.
INFO3-3 (rate limit) intentionally NOT addressed in code: the audit
notes this as architecturally a proxy-layer concern (rackham vhost),
not in-process. Rolled into the public-deploy commit when the vhost
work lands.
INFO3-4 (security primitive test coverage) deferred — separate test-
sweep PR, doesn't block deploy.
LAN-only Flask API that consumes Mealie (source of truth for recipes / plans
/ lists) and clawdforge (centralized claude -p runner) to do AI work.
v0.1 surface:
GET /healthz liveness + clawdforge upstream
GET /api/recipes proxy Mealie recipe list
POST /api/sterilize/preview/<slug> dry-run AI parse, return proposals
POST /api/sterilize/apply/<slug> write parses back to Mealie
Why sterilizer first: Mealie's CRF parser is mediocre and Cobb's hand-typed
recipes have lots of free-form ingredient strings ("about 2 cups cooked
white rice", "a pinch of salt") that don't aggregate cleanly into a
shopping list. We batch all ingredients of one recipe into a single Sonnet
call via clawdforge, get back parallel structured parses, then on apply
link each to Mealie food/unit records (creating missing by name) and PUT
the recipe back. Preview is non-destructive.
No UI in v0.1 — bearer-auth API only. Frontend + Authentik OIDC + Abby's
swamp/meadow/forest palette arrives in v0.2.
Auth: simple shared bearer in env (ADMIN_BEARER) until OIDC lands. LAN-only
deploy means the bearer is the only gate; no public exposure.
Stack: python:3.12-slim + Flask 3 + gunicorn + requests. No DB in v0.1.
